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ARTICLES 
 
 “There’s Danger Here, Cherie!”1 
LIABILITY FOR THE PROMOTION AND  
MARKETING OF DRUGS AND MEDICAL  
DEVICES FOR OFF-LABEL USES 
Richard C. Ausness† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Physicians often prescribe prescription drugs and other 
medications for uses that are not approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”), and such “off label” prescription 
is widely accepted within the medical community as a legiti-
mate form of treatment.2 However, the federal government 
discourages off-label prescription and use in various ways. For 
example, the FDA restricts the dissemination of information  
by drug companies about potential off-label therapies.3 In 
addition, federally funded health insurance programs such as 
Medicaid do not reimburse health care providers for off-label 
uses.4 Because drug companies make large profits from off-label 
prescriptions, they are often tempted to illegally promote off-
label uses of their products or to encourage health care 
providers to defraud the federal government by seeking reim-
bursement for off-label uses. This conduct is exceedingly risky 
and has cost drug companies hundreds of millions of dollars in 
  
 † Ashland Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A., 1966, and J.D., 
1968, University of Florida; LL.M., 1973, Yale University. 
 1  Harry Caray, legendary sportscaster for the Chicago Cubs baseball club, 
often exclaimed, “There’s danger here, Cherie,” when a home-run hitter for the 
opposing team stepped up to the plate.  
 2  See infra text accompanying notes 9-16. 
 3  See infra Part II.B. 
 4  42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(i)(10), 1396r-8(k)(3) (2000). 
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fines and civil penalties. Moreover, the current federal policy 
with respect to off-label use not only threatens the pocketbooks 
of drug companies, but also adversely affects public health by 
discouraging drug companies from publicizing promising off-
label therapies. A revision of the current policy is urgently 
needed. 
An off-label use is one that is not provided for on the 
product’s FDA-approved labeling.5 A doctor makes an off-label 
prescription when he or she prescribes a drug or medical device 
to treat a medical condition other than the one the drug or 
device was approved to treat.6 Off-label prescription also 
involves using a different method of applying the treatment as 
well as prescribing a drug or device to patient groups other 
than those for whom the FDA approved it.7 In addition, off-
label use includes prescriptions for drug dosages that are 
different from the recommended dosage or for periods that 
exceed the recommended use in the labeling.8  
Off-label uses are not necessarily unusual or experi-
mental.9 In fact, they are widely accepted within the medical 
community and may sometimes be the most effective treatment 
for certain types of medical conditions.10 It is estimated that 
between twenty and sixty percent of all prescriptions are for 
off-label uses.11 For example, a large percentage of prescriptions 
for pediatric use are off-label because many drugs are not 
tested or approved for use by children.12 Off-label uses are also 
common in cancer therapy and are often considered to be 
among the most effective treatments.13 Off-label uses are even 
  
 5 Stephanie Greene, False Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of 
Pharmaceutical Products, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 41, 43 (2005). 
 6 Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-
Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 
181, 189 (1999). 
 7 Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drug 
Products, 16 J. PROD. & TOXICS LIAB. 139, 141 (1994). 
 8 Elizabeth A. Weeks, Is It Worth the Trouble? The New Policy on Dissemi-
nation of Information on Off-Label Use Under the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 645, 647 (1999). 
 9 James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed 
Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 72 (1998). 
 10 See Martin Page, CBER Status on Reform Initiatives: Industry Reactions 
and Comments, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 193, 195 (1997). 
 11 Michael I. Krauss, Essay, Loosening the FDA’s Drug Certification 
Monopoly: Implications for Tort Law and Consumer Welfare, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
457, 472 (1996). 
 12 Salbu, supra note 6, at 193. 
 13 William L. Christopher, Off-Label Drug Prescription: Filling the Regula-
tory Vacuum, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 248-49 (1993). 
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more prevalent in the treatment of AIDS, where between 
ninety and one hundred percent of applications are thought to 
be off-label.14  
Courts have repeatedly held that certain off-label uses 
are legitimate forms of therapy.15 The FDA has also tacitly 
recognized that off-label uses are legitimate.16 Nevertheless,  
the FDA severely restricts the ability of drug manufacturers  
to promote off-label uses for their products.17 Thus, drug 
companies are forced to circumvent, or even violate, the law if 
they wish to inform physicians about beneficial off-label 
therapies (and make money from the increased sales of their 
products). The drug companies that cross the line and get 
caught face substantial civil and criminal liability. This Article 
concludes that the current FDA policy should be revised 
because it encourages criminal behavior on the part of phar-
maceutical companies and deprives physicians of potentially 
useful information about new and useful treatments.  
Part II examines the FDA’s drug and medical device 
approval processes, as well as its regulation of the promotion of 
off-label uses under the Food and Drug Modernization Act  
and various “guidance” documents issued pursuant to this 
legislation. Part II also describes some of the criminal and civil 
penalties that can be imposed for violating the FDA’s restric-
tions on the marketing of off-label uses. Part III discusses 
potential liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”), with particular attention to two 
recent cases, Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.18 and In re Neurontin Marketing, Sales Practices, and 
Products Liability Litigation.19 Part III will also discuss the 
liability of drug companies under the False Claims Act for 
directly and indirectly obtaining compensation from the federal 
government for the sale of products for off-label uses. Tort 
liability is the focus of Part IV. This includes tort claims based 
on violations of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, failure to warn about the risks of particular 
off-label uses, and failure to test for risks associated with off-
  
 14 Salbu, supra note 6, at 194. 
 15 See, e.g., Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1500 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1994); 
Upjohn Co. v. MacMurdo, 562 So. 2d 680, 683 (Fla. 1990). 
 16 Beck & Azari, supra note 9, at 77. 
 17 See infra at II.B. 
 18 187 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 19 433 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D. Mass. 2006). 
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label uses. Finally, Part V evaluates the FDA’s current policy 
concerning the promotion of off-label uses and concludes that it 
is too restrictive. 
II.  FDA REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 
A.  The FDA Drug Approval Process 
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)20 
authorizes the FDA to regulate the manufacture and market-
ing of prescription drugs and medical devices.21 Under the 
FDCA, the FDA must license any “new drug” before it may be 
marketed.22 The approval process begins with the submission of 
an Investigational New Drug Application.23 If the application  
is approved, the sponsor may proceed with the New Drug 
Application (“NDA”) process.24 The first phase of this process 
usually involves animal testing to determine toxicity.25 The 
drug then undergoes various types of clinical trials on human 
subjects.26 When the clinical trials have been completed, the 
sponsor must submit an NDA to the FDA for review. The NDA 
must include a list of all of the drug’s ingredients, detailed 
chemical information, detailed biological information, sum-
maries of clinical testing results, a summary of the risks and 
  
 20 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000). 
 21 See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of 
Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1764-835 (1996); see also Michael D. Green & 
William B. Schultz, Tort Law Deference to FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88 GEO. 
L.J. 2119, 2127-30 (2000) (discussing the difference between regulations for pre-
scription drugs and medical devices). The FDA also regulates over-the-counter 
pharmaceutical products. See Kenneth C. Baumgartner, A Historical Examination of 
the FDA’s Review of the Safety and Effectiveness of Over-the-Counter Drugs, 43 FOOD 
DRUG COSM. L.J. 463, 465-71 (1988). 
 22 21 U.S.C. § 355. 
 23 See id. § 355(i); Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Drug 
Applications, http://www.fda.gov/cder/Regulatory/applications/ind_page_1.htm (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2008). 
 24 Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of 
Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARV. L. REV. 773, 776 (1990). A somewhat different process 
applies to the approval of medical devices. See Beck & Azari, supra note 9, at 72-75. 
 25 James A. Wilsker, Note, One-Half Phen in the Morning/One Fen Before 
Dinner: A Proposal for FDA Regulation of Off-Label Uses of Drugs, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 795, 
806 (1998). 
 26 Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: 
Lessons from Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 741, 756 (2005). 
Clinical trials are usually divided into Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III: Phase I trials 
determine whether a small number of test subjects can tolerate various levels of 
exposure to the drug; Phase II trials evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the drug 
on a larger group of persons for whom the drug is ultimately intended; and Phase III 
trials carry out additional tests to determine the drug’s safety and efficacy. Id.  
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benefits of the drug, an environmental impact statement, 
marketing history, and proposed labeling.27  
A drug may only be marketed and labeled for the uses 
for which it received approval from the FDA.28 The FDA 
requires that a drug’s label include information necessary for 
safe and effective use, warnings, precautions, clinical pharma-
cology, indications, contraindications, and information about 
adverse reactions.29 FDA-approved labeling, which is primarily 
directed at physicians and other health care providers, is 
included as a product package insert and as an entry in the 
Physician’s Desk Reference.30 If a manufacturer wishes to add 
new approved uses to a drug’s labeling, it must submit a new 
NDA to the FDA.31 
The FDA’s approval process for medical devices, on the 
other hand, is governed by the Medical Device Amendments 
(“MDA”).32 The MDA creates three classes of medical devices 
that receive different levels of regulation. Class I devices are 
merely subject to “general controls” by the FDA.33 Class II 
devices are those for which “the general controls by themselves 
are insufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety 
and effectiveness of the device.”34 Class III medical devices are 
those (1) for which there is insufficient information to deter-
mine that general controls and special controls are adequate to 
provide reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness, and 
(2) are purported to be for sustaining human life or preventing 
impairment of human health, or present an unreasonable risk 
of illness or injury.35  
  
 27 21 C.F.R. § 314. 50 (2007); see also Beck & Azari, supra note 9, at 75-76. 
 28 Beck & Azari, supra note 9, at 76. 
 29 Salbu, supra note 6, at 186-87. 
 30 Edmund Polubinski, III, Note, Closing the Channels of Communication: A 
First Amendment Analysis of the FDA’s Policy on Manufacturer Promotion of “Off-
Label” Use, 83 VA. L. REV. 991, 995 (1997). 
 31 Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, Comment, Products Liability and “Off-Label” Uses 
of Prescription Drugs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 277 (1996). 
 32 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-360n (2000). 
 33 Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The 
Courts Run Amok, 59 MO. L. REV. 895, 913 n.88 (1994). “General controls” under the 
MDA include such requirements as maintenance of good manufacturing practices, 
sanitary packaging, and accurate labeling. Baker v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 
No. 95-58737, 1999 WL 811334, at *5 n.14 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1999). Class I devices include 
items such as surgeon’s gloves, eye pads and ice bags. 21 C.F.R. § 880.6050 (2007). 
 34 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B). Class II devices include items such as tampons, 
syringes, and neonatal incubators. 21 C.F.R. §§ 884.5460, 880.5860, 880.5400 (2007). 
 35 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C). Pacemakers and heart valves are examples of 
Class III devices. 21 C.F.R. §§ 870.3610, 870.3925 (2007). 
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Ordinarily, the manufacturer of a Class III medical 
device must submit a premarket approval application (“PMA”) 
to the FDA before marketing the device in interstate com-
merce.36 The PMA must contain a full report of any clinical 
investigations that concern the safety or effectiveness of the 
device.37 It must also contain “a full statement of the compo-
nents, ingredients, and properties and of the . . . principles of 
operation, of such device.”38 In addition, it must include “a full 
description of the methods used in, and the facilities and 
controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and, when 
relevant, packing and installation of, the device.”39 In the PMA, 
the applicant must identify, discuss, and analyze  
any other data, information, or report relevant to an evaluation of 
the safety and effectiveness of the device known to or that should 
reasonably be known to the applicant from any source, foreign or 
domestic, including information derived from investigations other 
than those proposed in the application and from commercial 
marketing experience.40  
The PMA must also include specimens of the labeling proposed 
to be used for the device.41 A Class III medical device is not 
subject to the PMA requirement if (1) it was marketed prior to 
the MDA’s enactment42 and a regulation requiring submission 
of PMAs has not been issued for the device or (2) it is 
“substantially equivalent” to a predicate device, that is, one 
marketed prior to the MDA’s enactment.43 Another exception to 
the PMA process permits a Class III device that obtains an 
Investigational Device Exemption (“IDE”) to be tested on 
human subjects without obtaining PMA approval.44  
Thus, manufacturers of both prescription drugs and 
medical devices must satisfy the FDA that their products are 
safe and effective before the agency will approve them for 
marketing.  
  
 36 21 U.S.C. § 360e. 
 37 Id. § 360e(c)(1)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(8)(i) (2007). 
 38 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(B).  
 39 Id. § 360e(c)(1)(C). 
 40 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(8)(ii) (2007).  
 41 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(F). 
 42  Id. § 360e(b)(1)(A). 
 43 Id. § 360e(b)(1)(B). 
 44 See id. § 360j(g). An IDE allows researchers to conduct clinical trials 
without first going through a formal PMA process in order to “encourage . . . the 
discovery and development of useful devices . . . and maintain optimum freedom for 
scientific investigators.” 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g). 
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B. FDA Regulation of the Promotion of Off-Label Uses  
by Drug Manufacturers 
Although the FDCA authorizes the FDA to regulate the 
manufacture and marketing of prescription drugs and medical 
devices, the FDA has never claimed any authority to regulate 
the practice of medicine.45 Therefore, physicians may use FDA-
licensed drugs or medical devices in any way they believe will 
benefit their patients and are not limited to approved uses.46 
However, the FDA can regulate advertising and promotion 
activities by drug manufacturers. In the past, the FDA pro-
hibited manufacturers from promoting a drug for any purpose 
that had not been approved.47 A company that promoted 
information about uses that had not received FDA approval 
was subject to liability for “misbranding.”48 The only exception 
to this policy was for the provision of information about off-
label uses when specifically requested by a physician.49 There 
were two reasons for the FDA’s prohibition of the dissemi-
nation of information about off-label uses. First, the FDA was 
concerned that the information about off-label uses provided by 
pharmaceutical companies to doctors might be incomplete.50 
Second, the FDA believed that allowing drug manufacturers to 
furnish such information would encourage them to bypass the 
FDA’s NDA process.51  
Eventually, the FDA issued guidance documents that 
permitted the dissemination of information about off-label uses 
in published form and at independent medical education 
programs. The first of these guidance documents sought to 
control drug manufacturers’ distribution of “enduring mater-
ials,” such as textbooks and reprints of journal articles.52 In 
1997, Congress enacted the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act (“FDAMA”),53 and Section 401 of the Act 
  
 45 Polubinski, supra note 30, at 999. 
 46 Beck & Azari, supra note 9, at 76. 
 47 Wilsker, supra note 25, at 808. 
 48 James O’Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and 
Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH 
L. 295, 301 (2003).  
 49 Greene, supra note 5, at 49. 
 50 Weeks, supra note 8, at 657.  
 51 Greene, supra note 5, at 48-49. 
 52 Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800-52,801 (Oct. 8, 
1996); see also infra text accompanying notes 56-58. 
 53 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
115, § 401, 111 Stat. 2296, 2356 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 et seq. (2000)). 
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incorporated the guidance provisions.54 According to FDAMA, a 
manufacturer was allowed to provide health care practitioners, 
pharmacy benefit managers, health insurance companies, 
group health plans, or governmental agencies with information 
about the safety, effectiveness, or benefits of an off-label use, 
provided that the manufacturer filed a supplemental 
application for the proposed off-label use with the FDA.55 In 
addition, the information disseminated to these qualified 
groups had to be in the form of unabridged peer-reviewed 
articles or qualified reference publications.56 Furthermore, the 
manufacturer was required to disclose that the use in question 
had not been approved or cleared by the FDA.57  
In 1997, the FDA also published the “Final Guidance on 
Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities”58 to 
regulate continuing medical education (“CME”) programs at 
which information about off-label uses was presented.59 The 
CME Guidance gave FDA approval to CME programs in which 
discussion of off-label uses was not influenced by pharma-
ceutical companies, but disapproved programs in which off-
label uses were discussed when the programs were controlled 
or influenced by drug manufacturers.60 To that end, the CME 
Guidance identified a number of factors to be considered in 
determining whether a program was independent of manu-
facturer influence and, therefore, permissible.61  
As mentioned above, Section 401 of the FDAMA allowed 
drug companies to disseminate information about off-label uses 
of FDA-approved products, but it expired on September 30, 
  
 54 Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa to 360aaa-6(a) (2000). 
 55 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(a). 
 56 Id. § 360aaa-1(a). 
 57 Id. §360aaa(b)(6)(A)(i). 
 58 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997). 
 59 I. Scott Bass et al., Off-Label Promotion: Is FDA’s Final Guidance on 
Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Programs Enforceable?, 53 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 193, 195 (1998). 
 60 Greene, supra note 5, at 49. 
 61 Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational 
Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074, 64,097-99 (Dec. 3, 1997). These factors include (1) who 
controls the content and selects the moderator and speakers; (2) whether drug 
manufacturer funding is disclosed; (3) whether unapproved uses will be discussed; 
(4) whether the central focus of the program is on one product; (5) the relationship 
between the corporate sponsors and the CME provider; (6) the process by which the 
audience is selected; (7) the availability of opportunities for meaningful discussion and 
questioning; (8) the dissemination of information; (9) the existence of ancillary 
promotional activities; and (10) complaints by the provider, participants or attendees 
about attempts by the supporting company to influence the program’s content. Id. 
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2006.62 Filling the regulatory void left by the FDAMA’s 
expiration, the FDA promulgated on February 15, 2008 a draft 
guidance document entitled “Good Reprint Practices,” which 
identifies how drug manufacturers should distribute scientific 
or medical journal reprints, articles, or reference works.63 This 
draft guidance document provides that the article or reference 
work recommending an off-label use should be published by an 
organization that has an editorial board.64 In addition, the 
publisher should fully disclose conflicts of interest or biases on 
the part of any author, contributor, or editor associated with an 
article.65 Articles should also be peer reviewed and published in 
accordance with established procedures.66 Furthermore, the 
draft guidance document discourages the distribution of special 
supplements or publications that have been funded by the 
manufacturer whose product is discussed in an article.67 
Moreover, it provides that the FDA considers articles that are 
not supported by credible medical evidence to be false and 
misleading and prohibits manufacturers from distributing 
them.68 The draft guidance document also requires that the 
reprint or reference publication be distributed in unabridged 
form.69 Finally, the draft guidance document makes it clear 
that the FDA retains its power to determine whether 
distribution of an article or publication constitutes promotion of 
an unapproved “new use” or whether such a product may be 
considered misbranded or adulterated under the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act.70  
The new FDA policy on the promotion of off-label uses, 
beginning with the passage of the FDAMA, is less restrictive 
than its previous approach, which prohibited manufacturers 
from providing any information about off-label uses unless 
physicians specifically asked for it. However, commentators 
  
 62 Id.; see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing Section 401). 
 63 FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC  
REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND 
APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/op/ 
goodreprint.html. 
 64 Id. pt. IV.A. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. pt. IV.B. 
 70 Id. pt. III. 
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have been critical of the guidance documents,71 and it appears 
that drug companies have shown little enthusiasm for working 
within the structure set forth by the FDA in these documents. 
C. Violations of FDA Regulations 
A drug company that improperly promotes its products 
for off-label uses will be subject to criminal sanctions and civil 
liability.72 The FDA considers unauthorized promotion to be 
misbranding.73  
The recent experience of Purdue Pharma, manufacturer 
of the prescription pain medication OxyContin, illustrates the 
perils of misbranding and other violations of the FDCA. The 
company was accused of encouraging physicians to prescribe 
OxyContin for use every eight hours instead of the twelve-hour 
dosage approved by the FDA.74 It eventually agreed to pay 
$19.5 million to twenty-six states and the District of Columbia 
to settle a civil suit based on its alleged promotion of off-label 
use of the painkiller.75 This led Connecticut Attorney General 
Richard Blumenthal to declare, “We are raising the bar on off-
label marketing—and other promotion tactics—that lead to 
abuse and diversion of prescription drugs.”76 However, Purdue 
Pharma suffered an even more serious blow when the U.S. 
Department of Justice brought criminal charges against the 
company and three of its top executives.77 Federal prosecutors 
contended that Purdue Pharma had engaged in a fraudulent 
and deceptive marketing campaign that falsely claimed that 
  
 71  E.g., Bass et al., supra note 59, at 209-12; Salbu, supra note 6, at 220-21; 
Polubinski, supra note 30, at 993, 1031. 
 72  Violations of the FDCA can result in fines, imprisonment, and civil 
penalties. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2006). 
 73 Mark A. Ford, Note, Another Use of OxyContin: The Case for Enhancing 
Liability for Off-Label Drug Marketing, 83 B.U. L. REV. 429, 438-39 (2003). The Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act generally considers a drug “misbranded” if its labeling fails  
to contain “adequate directions for use.” 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (2000). When the FDA 
approves a prescription drug or medical device for marketing, it approves specific 
labeling for the product. If a manufacturer promotes a drug for an unapproved use, its 
FDA-approved labeling will not contain any directions for that use and thus will be 
misbranded under § 352(f). Ford, supra, at 438.  
 74 Painkiller’s Maker Settles Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at C6. 
 75 Id. 
 76  Press Release, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, & Jerry Farrell, Jr., 
Attorney General, [Department of Consumer Protection] Commissioner [Conn.] 
Announce Oxycontin Maker Agrees to Halt Illegal Marketing 1 (May 8, 2007), 
available at http://www.ct.gov/dcp/lib/dcp/pdf/oxycontin_multistate_settlement.pdf . 
 77 Barry Meier, Narcotic Maker Guilty of Deceit Over Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 11, 2007, at A1. 
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OxyContin, because of its timed-release formula, was more 
resistant to abuse and less likely to cause addiction than 
competing products such as Percocet.78 The federal government 
also charged some company sales representatives with giving 
doctors misleading scientific data to support their fraudulent 
claims.79  
Pursuant to an agreement, Purdue Pharma and the 
three corporate officers pleaded guilty to these criminal 
charges.80 As part of the plea bargain deal, Purdue Pharma 
acknowledged that it had made false statements, and it agreed 
to pay $470 million in fines and payments to various state and 
federal agencies as well as $130 million to settle civil lawsuits 
brought against the company by former patients who claimed 
to have become addicted to OxyContin.81 According to federal 
prosecutors, the $600 million in fines and civil penalties that 
Purdue Pharma agreed to pay amounted to ninety percent of 
the profits that it initially made from OxyContin sales.82 
Furthermore, as part of the plea bargain deal, the court 
sentenced the company to five years’ probation.83  
Three company executives also pleaded guilty to 
misdemeanor charges of misbranding OxyContin, a violation of 
the FDCA that does not require proof that the defendants 
intended to defraud doctors or consumers or that they knew 
about the wrongdoing of others.84 These officials agreed to pay a 
total of $34.5 million in fines.85 At a “lengthy and highly 
emotional hearing” in federal district court, parents of those 
who had died from overdoses of OxyContin condemned the 
company officials and urged the court to reject the plea 
agreements and sentence the officials to jail terms.86 However, 
the court accepted the plea agreements and only sentenced the 
three officials to three years’ probation and 400 hours each of 
community service in drug treatment programs.87 Nevertheless, 
  
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Barry Meier, Big Part of OxyContin Profit Was Consumed by Penalties, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007, at C3. 
 83 Barry Meier, 3 Officials Sentenced in Case Involving OxyContin, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2007, at C4. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Meier, supra note 82. 
 86 Meier, supra note 83. 
 87 Id. 
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the judge expressed disappointment that he was unable to send 
the defendants to prison because federal prosecutors had not 
produced evidence that the company officials were aware of the 
wrongdoing at Purdue Pharma. 
Purdue Pharma illustrates that pharmaceutical compa-
nies and their executive officers who violate FDA regulations 
by promoting off-label uses run the risk of incurring huge fines 
or even incarceration if they are caught. 
III. LIABILITY BASED ON VIOLATIONS OF THE RACKETEER 
INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT  
AND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
Two other sources of statutory liability for manufac-
turers that promote off-label uses for their products are the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) 
and the False Claims Act. 
A.  RICO 
A number of RICO cases have been brought against 
pharmaceutical companies for illegally promoting off-label uses 
of prescription drugs. Although drug companies have won 
several of these cases, others are still in litigation. 
1.  Elements of RICO 
RICO was enacted in 1970 to combat the infiltration of 
organized crime into legitimate business enterprises.88 The 
statute imposes criminal and civil liability on any person who 
invests income from a pattern of racketeering activity in an 
enterprise,89 acquires an interest in an enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering activity,90 conducts an enterprise’s 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,91 or who 
conspires to do any of these things.92 An “enterprise” includes 
“any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other 
  
 88 Beth S. Schipper, Note, Civil RICO and Parens Patriae: Lowering 
Litigation Barriers Through State Intervention, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429, 431 
(1983); see also Bryce A. Jensen, Note, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond—A 
Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1334, 1354 
(2001).  
 89 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000).  
 90 Id. § 1962(b). 
 91 Id. § 1962(c). 
 92 Id. § 1962(d). 
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legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in 
fact although not a legal entity.”93 RICO defines “racketeering 
activity” to include various criminal acts such as mail fraud, 
wire fraud, drug trafficking, murder, arson, gambling, extor-
tion, bribery, and embezzlement.94 According to the statute,  
a “pattern of racketeering activity” consists of two or more acts 
of racketeering that occur within ten years of each other and 
that reflect a relationship and continuity in terms of purpose, 
results, participants, victims, or methods, but which are 
sufficiently distinct so that they amount to more than a single 
episode or an isolated occurrence.95 Because at least two of 
these offenses must be committed in order make out a claim 
under RICO, they are referred to as “predicate acts.”96 
There are two types of civil remedies available under 
RICO: damages and equitable relief. Any person injured in his 
business or property by reason of a RICO violation may sue  
for treble damages.97 In addition, a court may grant various 
equitable remedies, including restricting the defendants from 
engaging in certain activities in the future and even dissolving 
or restructuring the enterprise.98 Furthermore, RICO expressly 
authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to seek equitable relief in 
appropriate cases.99  
2. Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(“RPR”) illustrates the application of RICO in the context of  
off-label drug use promotion.100 The case involved the drugs 
Lovenox, Taxotere, Rilutek, and Nasacort AQ.101 An RPR 
employee and three former employees brought a civil claim 
  
 93 Id. § 1961(4). 
 94 Id. § 1961(1). 
 95 Id. § 1961(5). 
 96 Ed Dawson, Note, Legigation, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1727, 1740 (2001). 
 97 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
 98 Id. § 1964(a). 
 99 Id. § 1964(b). 
 100  See Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 187 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 
1999). 
 101 Id. at 946 (8th Cir. 1999). Lovenox was approved for use as a treatment for 
blood clotting; Taxotere was approved for cancer therapy; Rilutex was approved for 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS,” also known as Lou Gehrig’s disease); and 
Nasacort was approved to treat asthma. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition for 
Respondent Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals Inc. at 4, Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer Pharm., Inc., 528 U.S. 1117 (2000) (No. 99-803), available at 1999 WL 33632777.  
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under RICO against RPR; Genecom, RPR’s advertising agency; 
and a number of physicians who allegedly received illegal 
payments from RPR. The plaintiffs claimed that RPR illegally 
marketed drugs for off-label uses by providing information 
about off-label uses to its sales representatives and encour-
aging them to solicit physicians to prescribe its products for 
such uses.102 In addition, according to the plaintiffs, RPR, 
through Genecom, engaged physicians who prescribed RPR 
products for off-label uses to speak at CME events and paid 
them to promote off-label uses.103 The plaintiffs also alleged 
that RPR set sales quotas for its staff that implicitly included 
off-label sales and that when the plaintiffs reported these 
unlawful promotional activities to RPR lawyers, they were told 
to rewrite promotional event payment documents and destroy 
other evidence of illegal promotions.104  
Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that RPR and other 
defendants also violated RICO by conducting or participating 
in a pattern of racketeering activity by obtaining money from 
product sales generated by the illegal promotion of off-label 
uses of its products.105 The plaintiffs declared that RPR and 
other defendants sent promotional materials and obtained or 
paid money through the mail, transmitted promotional 
materials and made false representations through the use of 
interstate telephonic communications, and used the facilities of 
interstate commerce to distribute the proceeds gained from 
illegal kickbacks and payments made to influence the promo-
tion and use of RPR products.106  
Notwithstanding these allegations of wrongdoing, the 
lower court dismissed the plaintiffs’ civil RICO claims for lack 
of standing,107 and this decision was affirmed on appeal.108 The 
court declared that RICO’s civil enforcement provisions 
required that a plaintiff be “injured in his [or her] business or 
property by reason of a violation of section 1962.”109 Therefore, 
in order to have standing to sue under RICO, a plaintiff must 
allege (1) an injury to “business or property” (2) caused “by 
  
 102 Hamm, 187 F.3d at 946. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 176 F.R.D. 566, 571 (D. Minn. 
1997). 
 108 Hamm, 187 F.3d at 954. 
 109 Id. at 951 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). 
2008] “THERE’S DANGER HERE, CHERIE!” 1267 
reason of” a RICO violation.110 The court pointed out that the 
U.S. Supreme Court held in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.111 
that plaintiffs must be injured by conduct that constitutes 
racketeering activity (that is, predicate acts) and not by other 
wrongful acts committed by the defendant to have standing to 
sue under RICO.112 This requirement is imposed because the 
compensable harm under RICO is the commission of predicate 
acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise.113 In this 
case, however, the defendants’ fraudulent scheme to promote 
off-label uses of its products had not been directed at the 
plaintiffs, but at hospital administrators, physicians, and other 
medical personnel who prescribed and purchased RPR’s 
pharmaceutical products.114 The court concluded that since the 
employees had not been the intended targets of the alleged 
racketeering activity, they did not have standing to bring a 
civil RICO suit.115 
Although the plaintiffs were not directly injured by 
RPR’s illegal promotion of off-label uses of its products, they 
argued that they suffered the requisite injury to business or 
property by alleging that they had been terminated, denied 
promotions or raises, and defamed, as well as had lost stock 
options, after having criticized or refused to participate in 
RPR’s off-label promotion scheme.116 In response, the court 
pointed out that it had rejected similar allegations in Bowman 
v. Western Auto Supply Co.117 as a viable basis for a civil RICO 
lawsuit.118 According to the court in Bowman, “The simple act of 
discharging an employee . . . does not constitute racketeering 
activity as defined in RICO, and thus does not fall within the 
definition of what the Supreme Court has termed ‘predicate 
acts’ under RICO.”119 The plaintiffs argued that Bowman did 
not bar their RICO claims for defamation or damage to their 
business reputations.120 The court, however, declared that the 
plaintiffs could only sue under RICO if their injuries were 
  
 110 Id. 
 111 473 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1985). 
 112 Hamm, 187 F.3d at 952. 
 113 Id. (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497). 
 114 Id.  
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 947. 
 117 985 F.2d 383, 385-86 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 118 Hamm, 187 F.3d at 952. 
 119 Bowman, 985 F.2d at 385-86. 
 120 Hamm, 187 F.3d at 953. 
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directly caused by RICO violations.121 In this case, since the 
plaintiffs were not the targets of the fraudulent scheme, any 
damage to the plaintiffs’ business reputations was too indirect 
and remotely related to the defendant’s racketeering activities 
to support their RICO claim.122 
The court also concluded that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing because they failed to show any injury to their 
“business or property” as required by section 1964(c) of the 
RICO statute.123 The court observed that damage to one’s 
business reputation is a personal injury and not an injury to 
business or property.124 Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
argument that they could bring a conspiracy claim under RICO 
as long as their injuries were caused by an overt act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy, even though the act in question 
was not a predicate act.125 Although the court acknowledged 
that there was a circuit split on this issue, it decided to treat 
conspiracy the same as other claims for which a predicate act 
was required, as the Bowman court had done, because 
“[i]mposing the predicate act requirement on civil claims based 
on violations of § 1962(d) narrows the focus of those suits to the 
specific racketeering activity that lies at the heart of the RICO 
statute.”126 
Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer illustrates some of the 
difficulties plaintiffs face in civil RICO cases. However, as the 
Neurontin case discussed below shows, RICO may still be a 
potential source of liability for drug companies that illegally 
promote off-label uses.  
3. In re Neurontin Marketing, Sales Practices, and 
Products Liability Litigation  
In re Neurontin Marketing serves as another example  
of how RICO claims may be brought against pharmaceutical 
  
 121 Id. (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 
(1992)). 
 122 Id. at 954. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. (citing Chicago Heights v. Lobue, 914 F. Supp. 279, 285 (N.D. Ill. 1996); 
In re Teledyne Def. Contracting Derivative Litig., 849 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 n.1 (C.D. 
Cal. 1993)). 
 125 Id.  
 126 Id. (quoting Bowman, 985 F.2d at 388).  
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companies for promoting off-label uses.127 The case involved a 
class action by medical insurers against Pfizer and Warner-
Lambert Co., alleging that the pharmaceutical companies had 
engaged in a “fraudulent scheme to market the prescription 
drug Neurontin for a variety of off-label uses.”128 The defen-
dants moved to dismiss both the Amended Class Complaint 
and the First Coordinated Amended Complaint.129 A magistrate 
judge recommended that the motion be granted in part and 
denied in part.130 After a hearing, the district court endorsed 
most of the magistrate’s report, holding that the plaintiffs 
adequately alleged the existence of an enterprise and a pattern 
of racketeering activity.131 In addition, the court concluded that 
the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged the existence of a 
conspiracy.132  
The court’s opinion primarily focused on whether the 
plaintiffs adequately alleged the existence of an “enterprise” 
and whether the defendants had engaged in a “pattern of 
racketeering activity.” The court noted that the existence of an 
enterprise and the pattern of racketeering activity engaged in 
by the enterprise are separate and distinct elements of a RICO 
claim.133 However, according to the court, “proof of these two 
elements need not be separate or distinct but may in fact 
‘coalesce.’”134 
With regard to the enterprise element, the court 
observed that according to the RICO statute, an enterprise 
includes “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, 
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals 
associated in fact although not a legal entity.”135 Although the 
Supreme Court has declared that this language should be 
  
 127  See In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. 
Supp. 2d 172 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 128 Id. at 176. In 1994, the FDA approved Neurontin for use as an adjunctive 
treatment for epilepsy. However, about half of Neurontin prescriptions were for off-
label uses such as pain control and mono-therapy for epilepsy as well as treatment for 
bipolar conditions and attention deficit disorder. United States ex rel. Franklin v. 
Parke-Davis, Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 45 (D. Mass. 2001). 
 129 In re Neurontin, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 176-77. 
 130 Id.  
 131  Id. at 178-84. 
 132  Id. at 184. 
 133 Id. at 178. 
 134 Id. (citing United States v. Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2001)). 
 135 Id. at 177 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)). 
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interpreted broadly,136 an enterprise is limited to “a group of 
persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging 
in a course of conduct.”137  
In the Neurontin case, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants had created a large association-in-fact type of 
enterprise, composed of numerous marketing firms and 
physicians, in order to illegally promote off-label uses of 
Neurontin.138 As an alternative theory, the plaintiffs claimed 
that the defendants had created two smaller enterprises: one 
that carried out peer-to-peer selling of Neurontin for off-label 
uses and one that produced ghost-written articles promoting 
off-label uses of the drug.139 In addition to these theories, the 
plaintiffs also contended that the defendants had created 
enterprises with various medical marketing firms, with or 
without physicians who promoted Neurontin.140 To support 
these claims, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had 
joined together with marketing firms both to host events 
designed to promote Neurontin and also to publish articles that 
proclaimed the drug’s effectiveness for various off-label uses.141 
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants and their medical 
marketing partners had organized events designed to tout 
Neurontin while giving the appearance of being independent, 
and physicians had been paid by the defendants or their 
medical marketing firms to speak at these events and describe 
the favorable results they had obtained from off-label uses of 
Neurontin.142 Lastly, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants 
had selected material from the medical literature about off-
label uses of Neurontin, had sent it to medical marketing firms 
who would then write articles based on this material, and then 
had paid physicians to take credit as authors of the pieces 
when they were published.143  
In considering whether the plaintiffs established the 
existence of an enterprise, the court first observed that an 
enterprise must have a common purpose to satisfy the enter-
prise requirement. According to the plaintiffs, the common 
  
 136 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985); United 
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981). 
 137 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. 
 138 In re Neurontin, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 178. 
 139 Id.  
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
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purpose of each of the alleged enterprises was to market 
Neurontin for off-label uses in violation of FDA regulations.144 
The magistrate’s report conceded that members of the alleged 
enterprises may have shared a common purpose—to promote 
off-label uses of Neurontin—but noted that they did not share a 
common purpose to commit mail and wire fraud, the predicate 
acts alleged by the plaintiffs to support the RICO claim.145 After 
observing that “[t]here has been considerable confusion as to 
whether the common purpose needs to be illegal,” the court 
declared that the complaints adequately alleged an unlawful 
common purpose for each of the enterprises, “namely to 
illegally promote off-label uses of Neurontin.”146 However, as 
the court acknowledged, violation of FDA regulations was not 
“actionable” because violations of FDA regulations do not give 
rise to a private tort claim against the violator.147 
The court distinguished In re Pharmaceutical Industry 
Average Wholesale Price Litigation, a case where the plaintiffs 
tried to establish the existence of an enterprise composed of 
drug manufacturers and publishers of prescription drug price 
compendiums.148 In that case, the plaintiffs contended there 
was a common purpose between the manufacturers that had 
fraudulently inflated the average wholesale prices of drugs and 
the publishers of prescription drug compendia listing those 
inflated prices.149 However, the court held that the plaintiffs 
failed to satisfy the enterprise requirement under RICO 
because the publishers had been indifferent to the success of 
the drug companies’ fraudulent scheme and had had no intent 
themselves to defraud the medical community or the federal 
government when they published the price information.150 In 
contrast, the plaintiffs in Neurontin alleged that the members 
of the enterprise joined together to engage in unlawful conduct 
to achieve a shared goal, thereby satisfying the common 
purpose element of the pleading.151  
In the Neurontin court’s discussion of the enterprise 
requirement, it observed that it was not enough for the 
  
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 178-79. 
 146 Id. at 179-80. 
 147 Id.; see infra Part IV.A.1. 
 148 Id.; see In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 307 F. Supp. 
2d 196, 201-03 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 149  In re Neurontin, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 180. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 180-81. 
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plaintiffs to demonstrate that the parties had a common goal or 
purpose; they must also prove that the alleged enterprise  
was “an ongoing organization, not a set of smaller ad-hoc 
conspiracies engaged in the same activities independent of  
one another.”152 The magistrate’s report found that the drug 
manufacturers, medical marketing firms, and physicians did 
not work together as part a cohesive group, but instead 
resembled a “hub-and-spoke” assemblage of a conspiracy.153 The 
court examined the various enterprises identified by the 
plaintiffs to determine if any of them could be characterized as 
ongoing organizations functioning as continuing units and 
concluded that the relationship between the manufacturers of 
Neurontin and various marketing firms constituted an ongoing 
organization and not merely a series of ad hoc activities.154  
In making this determination, the court first examined 
the alleged “global enterprise,” consisting of the defendant drug 
companies, all of the medical marketing firms, and all of the 
physicians who made presentations or wrote articles advo-
cating off-label uses of Neurontin.155 The court agreed with the 
magistrate’s report that neither the medical marketing firms 
nor the physicians worked together with the defendants as a 
cohesive unit; rather, they had formed a hub-and-spoke 
operation, with the drug companies at the center managing 
several independent relationships.156 According to the court, the 
medical marketing firms and the physicians did not constitute 
an enterprise for purposes of RICO because there had been no 
“rim” to connect all of the spokes of the wheel.157 In other words, 
the drug companies had communicated with individual medical 
marketing firms and physicians, but individual medical mar-
keting firms and physicians had not communicated with one 
another.158 Since the plaintiffs could not show that there was  
a network involving all of these drug companies, medical 
  
 152 Id. at 182. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id.  
 158 Id.; see also VanDenBroeck CommonPoint Mortgage Co., 210 F.3d 696, 700 
(6th Cir. 2000); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 295 F. Supp. 2d 148, 174 
n.29 (D. Mass. 2003); First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 820 F. Supp. 89, 
98 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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marketing firms, and physicians, the court rejected their claim 
that a global enterprise existed.159 
Next, the court considered whether the alleged various 
“sub-entities” devoted to peer-to-peer selling of Neurontin and 
publication of articles touting off-label uses of the drug 
qualified as enterprises for purposes of RICO.160 The court 
concluded that these sub-entities had been composed of the 
same parties as the global enterprise and that, once again, the 
plaintiffs neither alleged the existence of a general agreement 
among these parties to carry out a common purpose nor alleged 
that there had been a cohesive network among these parties  
to accomplish common goals.161 The court determined conse-
quently that the sub-entity theory suffered from the same 
deficiency as the global enterprise allegation under RICO.162 
Finally, the court evaluated the plaintiffs’ claim that a 
series of smaller enterprises had existed, each comprised of  
the drug manufacturers and one of the physicians or market- 
ing firms, effectively making each hub-and-spoke association  
a separate enterprise for purposes of RICO.163 The court 
concluded that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that all the 
members of these purported enterprises had shared a common 
illegal purpose of promoting off-label uses of Neurontin.164 The 
remaining question, therefore, was whether these smaller 
associations had been ongoing organizations or merely ad hoc 
criminal conspiracies.165 In the case of associations between the 
defendant drug companies and medical marketing firms, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had formulated “tactical 
plans” with various marketing firms to promote off-label uses 
of Neurontin on an ongoing basis and that there had been 
regular communication between the defendants and these 
firms.166 In addition, there had been financial ties between the 
parties as the defendants had transferred money to medical 
marketing firms to pay physicians to make presentations and 
claim authorship of articles endorsing off-label uses of the 
defendants’ product.167 In light of these allegations, the court 
  
 159 In re Neurontin, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 182. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 183. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
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concluded that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the existence 
of ongoing relationships between the defendants and various 
medical marketing firms.168 
The enterprises referred to in the First Coordinated 
Amended Complaint were not limited to the defendants and 
various medical marketing firms as they were in the Amended 
Class Complaint; they had also included physicians who were 
allegedly paid by these marketing firms to promote off-label 
uses of Neurontin.169 Accordingly, the court considered whether 
physicians who had been paid to promote off-label uses of 
Neurontin were also part of these enterprises. Neither 
complaint alleged that these physicians knew that they were 
part of a “stable” maintained by the drug companies and the 
medical marketing firms or that they had been acting with 
other physicians in a coordinated effort to promote Neuron-
tin.170 However, the complaints did maintain that some of these 
physicians had had ongoing financial relationships with the 
defendants and their medical marketing firms and that the 
physicians had been essential to the success of the defendants’ 
scheme.171 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the plaintiffs 
failed to allege continuing relationships between any specific 
physicians and specific medical marketing firms sufficient  
for these physicians to be considered members of a RICO 
enterprise.172 
As a result of the court’s refusal to dismiss all of the 
plaintiffs’ complaints, the case proceeded to discovery, which 
will likely be hard fought and protracted.173  
  
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 184. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had engaged in a 
pattern of racketeering activity by fraudulently promoting off-label uses of Neurontin 
through the use of interstate mails and wire communications. Id. at 177. Thus, the 
predicate acts alleged were mail fraud and wire fraud. Id. at 179. However, the parties 
did not choose to address the predicate acts requirement at this stage of the 
proceedings. Instead, the court agreed to allow the plaintiffs to plead the particulars of 
the defendants’ use of interstate mails and wires after discovery. Id. at 184 n.5.   
 173 See In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 
55 (D. Mass. 2007) (overruling an objection to a motion to compel discovery). 
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B.  The False Claims Act 
The False Claims Act (“FCA”)174 provides another poten-
tial source of liability for drug companies that market their 
products for off-label uses.  
1.  Elements of the False Claims Act 
The False Claims Act is intended to deter the “submis-
sion of false or fraudulent claims to the government, to provide 
restitution to the government for money fraudulently taken 
from it, and to punish those who defraud the government.”175 
The Act imposes liability on any person who “knowingly 
presents, or causes to be presented, to . . . the United States 
Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 
approval” or who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made 
or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent 
claim paid or approved by the Government.”176 The Act further 
provides that any person who submits a false claim will be 
liable for treble damages for any loss suffered by the 
government.177 In addition, a defendant may be liable for a civil 
penalty of $5,000 to $10,000 for each false claim that he or she 
submits to the government.178  
The Act defines “knowingly” to refer to a person who 
“(1) has actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts in 
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; 
or (3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the 
information . . . .”179 Thus, innocent mistake and even ordinary 
negligence are defenses to FCA liability.180 The FCA does not 
provide a definition of “claim,” but courts have defined it as “a 
demand for money or for some transfer of public property.”181 
  
 174 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000). 
 175 Lisa Michelle Phelps, Note, Calling Off the Bounty Hunters: Discrediting 
the Use of Alleged Anti-Kickback Violations to Support Civil False Claims Actions, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1998). The FCA was enacted during the Civil War to combat 
procurement fraud and price gouging by army contractors. John Terrence et al., Clear 
and Convincing to Whom? The False Claims Act and Its Burden of Proof Standard: 
Why the Government Needs a Big Stick, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1409, 1423 (2000). 
 176 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)-(2).  
 177 Id. § 3729(a)(7). 
 178 Id. 
 179 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b). 
 180 Pamela H. Bucy, Growing Pains: Using the False Claims Act to Combat 
Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV. 57, 61-62 (1999). 
 181 United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958). 
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The term also includes material representations made to avoid 
paying money owed to the government.182 Fraud or fraudulent 
conduct must be material in the sense that it could influence 
the government’s payment decision.183 In addition, there must 
be “a causal relationship between the false claim and the 
government’s injury.”184 
The FCA authorizes private individuals, known as 
relators,185 to bring qui tam186 actions on behalf of the U.S. 
government.187 Relators may be private citizens, employees of 
government contractors, or employees of government agencies 
and private companies, including suppliers and competitors of 
the defendant.188 In order to maintain a qui tam action, the 
relator must comply with the strict procedural requirements of 
the FCA.189 The private plaintiff must, for example, serve a copy 
of the complaint and disclose substantially all material 
evidence in the plaintiff’s possession to the federal govern-
ment.190 Upon receipt of the complaint, the government may 
investigate the claims and may elect to intervene and take over 
prosecution of the action.191 The plaintiff’s complaint remains 
under seal during the government’s period of investigation.192 If 
the government chooses to intervene, the government itself 
conducts the civil action.193 If the government chooses not to 
intervene in the matter, the private plaintiff has the right to 
continue to prosecute the case on behalf of the government.194 
However, the relator will not be able to recover attorneys’ fees 
  
 182 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7). 
 183 Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of 
Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 189 (2001). 
 184 Id. at 191. 
 185 Robert L. Vogel, The Public Disclosure Bar Against Qui Tam Suits, 24 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 477, 478 (1995). 
 186 “Qui tam” is short for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac 
parte sequitur,” which means “he who sues on behalf of the King as well as for 
himself.” Bucy, supra note 180, at 57-58. 
 187 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). 
 188 William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices 
in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1812 (1996). 
 189 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). 
 190 Id. § 3730(b)(2). 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. This period is at least sixty days, but the DOJ may seek extensions of 
the sixty-day waiting period. Kovacic, supra note 188, at 1817. 
 193 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(A). 
 194 Id. § 3730(b)(4)(B). 
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or other litigation expenses if he or she is not successful.195 If 
the government successfully prosecutes the action, the relator 
is entitled to between 15% and 25% of the government’s 
recovery,196 but if the government does not pursue the case and 
the relator successfully prosecutes it instead, he or she will be 
awarded between 25% and 30% of the judgment.197 
Since the FCA’s initial passage in 1863, Congress has 
amended it on several occasions. In 1943, Congress prohibited 
all qui tam actions based on evidence or information that the 
government had when the action was brought.198 After the 
amendment was enacted, there was a significant decrease in 
the use of the FCA’s qui tam provisions.199 Consequently, in 
1986, Congress set out to encourage more private enforcement 
actions by increasing financial awards to private plaintiffs, 
lowering the plaintiff’s burden of proof, and allowing a private 
plaintiff to participate in actions in which the government 
elects to intervene.200 At the same time, in order to discourage 
“parasitic” lawsuits, Congress added a new jurisdictional 
provision to the FCA.201 A qui tam suit may be dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction if the allegations in the FCA complaint have 
been previously disclosed publicly or if the lawsuit is based  
on the publicly disclosed information.202 Public disclosure  
may come from such sources as criminal, civil, or adminis-
trative hearings; congressional, administrative, or Government 
Accounting Office reports; hearings, audits, or investigations; 
and reports in the news media.203 The issue of whether a qui 
tam action is “based upon” a public disclosure arises “when the 
information contained in the qui tam action has been publicly 
disclosed, but the relator has not relied upon it in bringing the 
  
 195 Christopher C. Frieden, Comment, Protecting the Government’s Interests: 
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 196 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). 
 197 Id. § 3730(d)(2). 
 198 Robert Fabrikant & Glenn E. Solomon, Application of the Federal False 
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REV. 105, 107 (1999).  
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qui tam action.”204 The prevailing rule is that a qui tam action 
is “based upon” public disclosure if the action is “supported by” 
or is “substantially identical” to the publicly disclosed infor-
mation.205 However, even if the allegations in the lawsuit are 
based upon publicly disclosed information, the relator is not 
barred from bringing a qui tam action if he or she is the 
“original source” of the information.206 The False Claims Act 
defines an “original source” as “an individual who has direct 
and independent knowledge of the information on which the 
allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the 
information to the Government before filing an action under 
this section which is based on the information.”207 
2.  United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis 
United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis serves as 
an example of how a case may be brought under the FCA 
against a pharmaceutical manufacturer for the promotion of 
off-label drug use.208 The case involved two prescription drugs 
manufactured by Parke-Davis, Neurontin and Accupril. In 
1994, the FDA had approved Neurontin for use as an 
adjunctive treatment for epilepsy.209 However, according to the 
relator, by 1996, more than half of Neurontin sales had been 
for off-label uses such as pain control, mono-therapy for 
epilepsy, treatment of bipolar conditions and treatment of 
attention deficit disorder.210 Furthermore, half of these off-label 
uses had been allegedly reimbursed by the federal government 
either indirectly through Medicaid or directly through 
purchases by the Veterans Administration (“VA”).211 The relator 
also claimed that Parke-Davis had promoted Accupril, an ACE 
inhibitor approved for the treatment of hypertension and heart 
failure, for off-label uses.212 
  
 204 Bucy, supra note 180, at 95. 
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53 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 206 Bucy, supra note 180, at 88-89. 
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In 1996, a former employee filed a nine-count qui tam 
action charging that the defendant had engaged in a fraudulent 
scheme to promote the sale of Neurontin and Accupril for off-
label uses and that this illegal marketing campaign had caused 
numerous false claims to be submitted to the Veterans 
Administration and to the federal government for reimburse-
ment under its Medicaid program.213 The complaint remained 
under seal for several years while the Justice Department 
decided whether to intervene.214 Finally, in December of 1999, 
the complaint was unsealed and the litigation began in 
earnest.215 The Justice Department decided to participate only 
on an amicus curiae basis, but reserved the right to intervene 
as plaintiff at a later date.216 
The relator, Dr. David Franklin, had been employed by 
the defendant as a “medical liaison” for about five months 
during 1996.217 Although medical liaisons ordinarily work in the 
research divisions of drug manufacturers, Dr. Franklin claimed 
that Parke-Davis’s medical liaisons were employed exclusively 
as promotion personnel.218 According to Franklin, the defendant 
instructed its medical liaisons “to make exaggerated or false 
claims concerning the safety and efficacy of Parke-Davis’s 
drugs for off-label uses.”219 Medical liaisons had been 
encouraged to inflate their scientific credentials and to pose as 
research personnel instead of sales representatives to bolster 
their credibility with physicians.220 Furthermore, when phys-
icians had asked about whether patients could be reimbursed 
for off-label prescriptions by Medicaid or other insurers, 
“medical liaisons were instructed to coach doctors on how to 
conceal the off-label nature of the prescription.”221 The relator 
also alleged that doctors had received kickbacks for prescribing 
large quantities of the defendant’s products, including cash 
payments and gifts.222 Finally, he claimed that Parke-Davis  
had attempted to conceal its promotion of off-label uses from  
the FDA by shredding and falsifying documents and by 
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encouraging medical liaisons to conduct their marketing 
activities without leaving a “paper trail” that might be 
discovered by the FDA. 
The first issue the court addressed was the requirement 
imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) that “the 
circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with 
particularity.”223 This particularity requirement should be read 
in pari materia with Rule 8(a), which allows a plaintiff to make 
“a short and plain statement” for relief.224 The court explained 
that these two provisions, taken together, required the relator 
to allege the circumstances of the fraud—the “‘who, what, 
when, where, and how’ of the alleged fraud”—but did not 
require that he plead all of the evidence or facts that supported 
his allegation.225 
Applying these principles to the relator’s Medicaid fraud 
claims, the court concluded that the complaint, standing alone, 
lacked the specificity required by Rule 9(b).226 However, the 
court allowed the relator to supplement the allegations in his 
complaint with the more specific information contained in his 
disclosure to the government pursuant to the FCA in 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(b)(2).227 The disclosure, which had been provided to  
both the court and the defendant, described Dr. Franklin’s 
experiences as a “medical liaison” for Parke-Davis and was 
supported by approximately twenty exhibits.228 Viewed in light 
of the relator’s disclosure, the court found that his complaint 
contained allegations of fraud with respect to the off-label 
promotion of Neurontin sufficient to satisfy the particularity 
requirements of Rule 9(b), at least with regard to the Medicaid 
sales.229 According to the court, the complaint described a 
fraudulent scheme designed to increase the submission of off-
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label Neurontin prescriptions for payment by Medicaid (but  
not the VA) and identified various false statements made to 
physicians to induce them to prescribe Neurontin for off-label 
uses.230  
As far as the “who” requirement was concerned, the 
relator’s disclosure identified by name various individuals at 
Parke-Davis who allegedly had instructed the medical liaisons 
on how to fraudulently promote off-label uses of the drug.231 In 
addition, it listed all of the medical liaisons by name, as well as 
the physicians who had been contacted and given false 
information and kickbacks in order to encourage them to 
increase their off-label prescriptions.232 This was sufficient to 
satisfy the court. The court determined that the relator also 
fulfilled the “what” requirement by alleging that the defendant 
had caused numerous Neurontin prescriptions to be submitted 
for payment by Medicaid knowing that they were ineligible for 
payment because they had been prescribed for an off-label 
use.233 The “when” requirement was met as well since the 
relator specified the five-month period during which he had 
been employed by Parke-Davis.234 Finally, the court found that 
the relator fulfilled the “how” requirement by describing in the 
complaint and the disclosure the defendant’s fraudulent 
marketing campaign involving kickbacks and misleading 
statements designed to encourage doctors to prescribe 
Neurontin for unapproved uses.235  
But the court dismissed the portion of the complaint 
alleging that Parke-Davis had promoted off-label uses of 
Neurontin in direct sales to the VA.236 The court ruled that the 
relator’s allegations were not specific enough because they did 
not identify which Parke-Davis employees had engaged in 
fraudulent conduct, where the conduct had taken place, or 
which VA personnel had been involved.237 In addition, the 
complaint failed to identify any specific fraudulent statements 
that the defendant’s employees had made to VA personnel.238  
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The court also dismissed a count of the complaint 
alleging that the defendant had illegally promoted off-label 
uses of Accupril.239 Specifically, the complaint alleged that 
Parke-Davis employees had falsely informed physicians that 
scientific studies had shown Accupril to be more effective than 
other ACE inhibitors.240 However, as the court observed, the 
relator’s disclosure did not identify any of the medical liaisons 
who had been involved in the fraud, any of the doctors who had 
received false information, or any of the false claims that had 
been made.241 
Having concluded that some of the claims against 
Parke-Davis were specific enough to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s 
particularity requirement, the court then responded to the 
defendant’s argument that its conduct did not constitute a 
violation of the False Claims Act.242 First, the defendant 
contended that the relator’s lawsuit was an improper attempt 
to use the FCA to create a private cause of action for a violation 
of the FDCA.243 The court conceded that Congress did not 
authorize either the FDA or private individuals to enforce the 
agency’s prohibition against the marketing of drugs for off-label 
uses through civil actions for damages.244 However, the court 
held that the FCA could be invoked to bring a civil action when 
the violation of an FDA rule or regulation enabled the 
defendant to obtain a government benefit by fraud.245 
Therefore, a drug manufacturer who knowingly causes a false 
statement to be made in order to have a false claim paid or 
approved by the government is subject to liability under the 
FCA regardless of whether its conduct also violates an FDA 
regulation.246 
Parke-Davis also argued that its promotion of off-label 
uses had not involved the sort of false statement or fraudulent 
conduct necessary to constitute a violation of the FCA since it 
had only made truthful statements to physicians who provided 
services to patients covered by Medicaid.247 However, the court 
did not need to decide this issue since Parke-Davis was also 
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accused of engaging in a course of fraudulent conduct, 
including knowingly making false statements encouraging 
doctors to submit claims not eligible for payment under the 
Medicaid program.248 The FCA claim arose not from the fact 
that the defendant had promoted off-label uses of its products, 
but rather from the fact that it had engaged in fraudulent 
conduct causing claims to be submitted to Medicaid for 
unauthorized uses.249 
Furthermore, Parke-Davis maintained that the inde-
pendent actions of the physicians who wrote the off-label 
prescriptions and the pharmacists who filled them had been an 
intervening force that broke the chain of legal causation from 
the pharmaceutical manufacturer.250 However, the court 
pointed out that such an intervening force would break the 
causal connection only if it were unforeseeable.251 In this case, 
the participation of doctors and pharmacists in the submission 
of false claims to Medicaid had not only been foreseeable but 
was the intended result of the defendant’s fraudulent scheme.252 
Thus, this argument by the defendant was also unavailing. 
Finally, Parke-Davis contended that any false state-
ments that it had made to physicians were not material to the 
government’s decision to pay claims for off-label prescriptions 
of Neurontin.253 The court, however, noted that a defendant 
need not make a false claim directly to the government to be 
held liable under the FCA; it was sufficient in this case for the 
relator to allege that Parke-Davis had knowingly caused the 
submission of false claims through a fraudulent course of 
conduct.254 The fact that the prescriptions had been for an off-
label use was material because the government would not have 
paid for such prescriptions if it had known the use for which 
they had been submitted.255 While the court acknowledged that 
the relator’s theory of liability was somewhat novel and 
expansive, it concluded that the language of the FCA supports 
the notion that one who causes a false or fraudulent claim  
to be made may be held liable.256 The court supported this 
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interpretation of the Act by noting that “the terms of the FCA 
must be read liberally in accordance with their remedial 
purpose.”257 
Thus, the court dismissed some of the counts in the 
relator’s complaint, but allowed the critical claim to go 
forward.258 In 2004, the case was settled when Warner-
Lambert, the parent company of Parke-Davis, pleaded guilty to 
two criminal FDCA misbranding violations and settled the civil 
cases, ultimately paying $430 million in criminal fines and civil 
damages.259 The relator, Dr. Franklin, received $24.6 million  
as part of the settlement between the defendant and the 
Department of Justice.260 
3. United States ex rel. Hess v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc. 
The relator in United States ex rel. Hess v. Sanofi-
Synthelabo, Inc. was less successful than Dr. Franklin in 
bringing an FCA claim against a pharmaceutical company for 
promoting off-label uses. In Hess, the relator brought a qui tam 
action against his former employer, Sanofi-Synthelabo, alleging 
that it had fraudulently marketed drugs to physicians for off-
label uses.261 For the reasons explained below, a federal district 
court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of 
action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b).262 
The relator, who had worked for the defendant as a 
sales representative from 2001 until 2004, claimed that the 
defendant had relied upon incomplete, unreliable, and mis-
leading clinical data to promote off-label uses of its drugs 
Eloxatin and Elitek.263 In 2002, Eloxatin had been approved by 
the FDA to help treat fourth-stage colorectal cancer.264 That 
same year, the FDA had approved Elitek “for the treatment 
and prevention of tumor lyses syndrome . . . in pediatric 
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patients,” but declined to approve the drug for treatment of the 
disease in adults.265 According to the relator, the defendant had 
provided him and other sales representatives with training on 
off-label uses of Eloxatin and had instructed them on how 
Medicare reimbursement for off-label uses of the drug could be 
obtained.266 In addition, the relator alleged that the defendant 
had induced Wisconsin Physician Services (“WPS”), the Medi-
care administrator for Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and 
Michigan, to authorize the use of Eloxatin for the treatment of 
colorectal cancer in the first line and adjuvant setting even 
though these were off-label uses at the time.267 Finally, the 
relator also claimed that the defendant had briefed him and 
other sales representatives about off-label uses of Elitek in 
adult patients and had encouraged them to promote off-label 
uses of the drug.268  
In its motion to dismiss, the defendant contended that 
the relator failed to allege that it had made any misrepresen-
tations to doctors, the government, or anyone else regarding 
Eloxatin. Nor did the relator allege that any doctor had pre-
scribed Eloxatin improperly or that any doctor who had 
prescribed Eloxatin had made any misrepresentations to 
Medicare in order to obtain reimbursement for off-label uses  
of the drug. Furthermore, the relator did not allege that the 
information provided by the defendant about off-label uses of 
Elitek had been either false or deceitful.269 
In the case of Eloxatin, the court acknowledged that 
physicians had filed claims for Medicare reimbursement for off-
label uses of the drug.270 The court also agreed that the FCA is 
broad enough to impose liability on a drug company who 
knowingly assists the government to pay fraudulent claims to a 
third person even if the drug company does not have any direct 
contractual relations with the government.271 However, the 
court cautioned that in order to state a valid claim under the 
FCA, the relator must show that the defendant made a 
  
 265 Id. 
 266 Id.  
 267 Id.  
 268 Id. The FDA subsequently approved Eloxatin for treatment of colorectal 
cancer in the first line and adjuvant settings after the defendant submitted 
supplemental New Drug Applications for these uses. Id.  
 269 Id. at *4. 
 270 Id. at *7. 
 271 Id. (citing United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 
39, 48 (D. Mass. 2001)). 
1286 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:4 
material misrepresentation.272 To satisfy this materiality 
requirement, the relator had to allege, with the required 
specificity, (1) that the defendant had fraudulently promoted 
certain off-label uses of Eloxatin to doctors; (2) that these 
doctors had submitted Medicare claims for these off-label uses; 
and (3) that these claims had resulted from the defendant’s 
promotion of the off-label uses.273 Thus, the relator had to show 
that but for the defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations, the 
doctors would not have made claims to Medicare for off-label 
uses of Eloxatin and that but for these fraudulent misrepre-
sentations, Medicare would not have reimbursed the doctors.274  
The court concluded that the relator failed to establish 
this causal connection. The relator alleged that although 
Eloxatin had only been approved for second-line treatment of 
fourth stage colorectal cancer, the defendant had encouraged 
physicians to submit Medicare claims for other stages of 
colorectal cancer.275 The court noted that although the Medicare 
reimbursement form did have a line for a patient’s diagnosis, it 
did not require doctors to indicate the stage of a patient’s 
cancer.276 Therefore, the court concluded that the stage of 
cancer was not material to either the doctor’s Medicare 
reimbursement claim or to the government’s decision to pay the 
claim.277 Thus, the defendant’s conduct had not caused false 
claims to be made to the government. 
The court then considered whether the relator had 
pleaded sufficient evidence of intent as required by the FCA. 
The FCA requires that there be “actual knowledge that the 
information was untrue or deliberate ignorance or reckless 
disregard of the truth or falsity of that information” on the part 
of the defendant.278 The court determined that the relator did 
not allege that the defendant had deliberately lied to either its 
sales staff or to the doctors who prescribed Eloxatin. Nor did 
the relator claim that the information the defendant had 
disseminated about off-label uses was incorrect or false.279 
Instead, he merely alleged that the information was 
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“immature, unreliable and misleading.”280 Nor did the relator 
allege that the defendant had assisted doctors to make fraud-
ulent claims. As the court already concluded, the Medicare 
reimbursement for off-label uses of Eloxatin had not been 
fraudulent because the alleged off-label use was for the 
treatment of an earlier stage of colorectal cancer and the 
Medicare forms in question did not require doctors to identify 
the stage of a patient’s cancer.281 Consequently, the court 
concluded that the relator’s complaint failed to satisfy the 
FCA’s intent requirement.282 
With regard to Elitek, the court found that the only 
factual allegations the relator made to support his claim were 
that the defendant had informed him and other sales repre-
sentatives about off-label uses of the drug, had encouraged 
them to promote these off-label uses, and had pressured them 
to derive a substantial amount of Elitek sales from these off-
label uses.283 However, the court also determined that the 
relator’s complaint failed to identify the time or place of the 
allegedly false representations regarding Elitek, nor did it 
describe the nature or content of the claims that it alleged had 
been fraudulent.284 Furthermore, the relator failed to allege 
that the doctors to whom the defendant’s sales representatives 
promoted off-label uses of Elitek actually had submitted false 
claims to the government for such uses.285 Instead, the relator’s 
allegations were “vague, conclusory, and lack[ed] the requisite 
specificity to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to either 
Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 9(b).”286 Accordingly, the court granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the relator’s claims regarding 
Elitek.  
Finally, the court rejected the relator’s argument that 
the defendant should be found liable under 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(3) of the FCA, which creates liability for persons who 
conspire to defraud the government through fraudulent claims 
or payments.287 According to the court, to state a claim for 
conspiracy:  
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[A] plaintiff must allege: “(1) that the defendant conspired with one 
or more persons to get a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid by 
the United States, and (2) that one or more conspirators performed 
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, and (3) that the United 
States suffered damages as a result of the false or fraudulent 
claim.”288 
In this case, the relator did not plead facts suggesting that 
physicians had provided fraudulent or false information to  
the government or that the defendant had provided such infor-
mation to the physicians.289 Moreover, the court found that the 
relator did not allege any facts indicating that the defendant 
had acted in concert with physicians to make false or fraudu-
lent claims to the government.290 Finding that the relator’s 
allegation of a conspiracy did not meet the particularity 
requirements of Rule 9(b), the court ruled that the conspiracy 
claim should be dismissed as well.291 Thus, the court dismissed 
the relator’s complaint in its entirety.292 
Hess illustrates the challenges plaintiffs face when they 
bring qui tam actions against drug companies under the FCA. 
In particular, both the materiality requirement and the intent 
requirement of the Act present significant obstacles to success. 
4. United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc. 
United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc. provides a third 
example of how an FCA claim may be brought against a 
pharmaceutical company that has promoted off-label uses. The 
relator in this case, Dr. Peter Rost, brought a qui tam action 
against Pfizer and Pharmacia Corporation, which had been 
acquired by Pfizer in 2003, alleging that they had engaged in 
illegal off-label marketing of the drug Genotropin and had 
knowingly caused false claims to be submitted to federal and 
state health insurance programs.293 The alleged fraudulent 
conduct had taken place between 1997 and 2003.294 The 
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the 
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court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the public 
disclosure bar and that the claim failed to allege fraud with 
sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b).295 The district court 
rejected the claim that the public disclosure bar applied,296 but, 
like the Hess court, dismissed the relator’s case because his 
allegations were not sufficiently specific to meet the require-
ments of Rule 9(b)297 On appeal, the First Circuit agreed with 
the conclusions of the trial court, but held that the relator 
should be given a chance to amend his complaint.298 
 Genotropin is a recombinant or man-made human 
growth hormone that had been approved by the FDA to treat 
certain hormonal deficiencies in both adults and children.299 
The FDA had not approved the drug as a treatment for short 
children without hormonal deficiencies or as an anti-aging 
treatment for adults.300 However, the relator alleged that, 
beginning in 1997, Pharmacia marketed Genotropin to increase 
growth in short children and to delay the aging process in 
adults.301 Pharmacia had given bribes, kickbacks, and other 
incentives to doctors to prescribe Genotropin and to wholesale 
drug distributors to recommend Genotropin for off-label uses.302 
The company also had rewarded sales representatives for every 
new Genotropin patient, regardless of whether the prescription 
was for an approved or an off-label use.303 As a result of these 
marketing efforts, approximately sixty percent of adult sales 
and twenty-five percent of pediatric sales of Genotropin had 
been for off-label uses during this period.304  
As manager of Pharmacia’s Endocrine Care Unit, Dr. 
Rost had overseen the worldwide marketing of Genotropin, but 
had not been involved in the day-to-day marketing or sales of 
the drug.305 However, when he learned of Pharmacia’s off-label 
marketing of Genotropin, Dr. Rost had unsuccessfully tried to 
put a stop to the practices.306 When Pfizer acquired Pharmacia, 
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it confirmed the relator’s charges and notified senior officials at 
the FDA and the Office of the Inspector General about the  
off-label marketing.307 In 2003, while the FDA was still 
investigating the Genotropin issue, the relator filed a qui tam 
action alleging fraud in the off-label marketing of Genotropin 
by Pharmacia.308 In late 2005, the DOJ decided not to intervene 
in the case, leaving Dr. Rost to proceed on his own.309 
The defendant moved to dismiss the claim for lack  
of subject matter jurisdiction based on the FCA’s “public 
disclosure bar.”310 In its decision, the trial court declared that it 
must determine whether the allegations of fraud in the 
complaint were “publicly disclosed” before the relator filed his 
lawsuit and whether the allegations were “based upon” that 
disclosure.311 The relator argued that the defendants’ voluntary 
disclosures had not amounted to a “public disclosure” because 
they had not been disclosed in a statutorily required manner.312 
The court agreed, finding that the public disclosure bar 
prohibited qui tam actions only when the plaintiff’s allegations 
were “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or 
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in  
a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting 
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news 
media . . . .”313 
The court observed that Congress intended the public 
disclosure bar to prohibit only truly parasitic lawsuits.314 
Actions in which the disclosed information lies only in the 
hands of the government and the party who disclosed it to the 
government are not parasitic.315 In other words, a qui tam 
action is not parasitic when a private plaintiff does not, and 
cannot, know what information may already be in the 
government’s possession.316 Consequently, the court ruled that 
the defendants’ voluntary disclosure of information to various 
  
 307 Rost I, 446 F. Supp. 2d. at 10. 
 308 Id. at 11. 
 309 Id. 
 310 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000). The FCA’s “public disclosure bar” provides 
for the dismissal of qui tam actions that are based on information that has already 
been disclosed to the public. See supra text accompanying notes 203-207. 
 311 Rost I, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 15. 
 312 Id.  
 313 Id. at 18 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1994)). 
 314 Id.  
 315 Id. 
 316 Id. 
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government officials did not constitute a public disclosure for 
purposes of the FCA’s jurisdictional bar.317 
On appeal, the First Circuit agreed that disclosures 
made by Pfizer to the government would not prevent the 
relator from bringing his suit against the pharmaceutical 
company under the public disclosure bar of the FCA.318 
According to the court: 
In our view, a “public disclosure” requires that there be some act of 
disclosure to the public outside of the government. The mere fact 
that the disclosures are contained in government files someplace, or 
even that the government is conducting an investigation behind the 
scenes, does not itself constitute public disclosure. Our construction 
of the term “public disclosure” does not turn on the fact that Pfizer 
requested or assumed that its disclosures to the investigating 
agencies would be held confidential.319 
The appeals court also declared that Pfizer’s position was 
“inconsistent with our understanding of the language, 
structure, and history of the [False Claims] Act.”320 According  
to the court, the FCA’s public disclosure provision was intended 
to prevent relators from bringing qui tam actions “based on 
information made available to the public during the course of  
a government hearing, investigation, or audit.”321 Elaborating 
on the distinction between disclosure to the government and 
disclosure to the public, the court observed that § 3730 uses the 
term “government” many times but never in a sense synony-
mous with the public.322 Reviewing the FCA’s legislative 
history, the court pointed out that the 1986 amendments 
removed a provision that barred private lawsuits whenever the 
government was aware of the allegations or transactions set 
forth in the relator’s complaint.323 The court reasoned that those 
amendments reflected Congress’s determination that the 
earlier version of § 3730 unduly restricted private enforcement 
of the FCA.324  
The court rejected the argument that Pfizer’s proposed 
government knowledge bar was nevertheless consistent with 
  
 317 Id.  
 318 Rost II, 507 F.3d 720, 728 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 319 Id. 
 320 Id.  
 321 Id. at 729 (quoting United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 
17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 322 Id. 
 323 Id.  
 324 Id. 
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congressional intent because it would only apply in limited 
circumstances.325 Relying on a Seventh Circuit case, Pfizer 
contended that a government knowledge bar based on § 3730 
only applies where the government official to whom the 
disclosure is made is the appropriate investigatory official.326 
However, the court declared that it could “find no support in 
either the language or the history of the statute for such a 
reading.”327 Furthermore, the court concluded that Pfizer’s 
argument was inconsistent with its opinion in United States ex 
rel. S. Prawer & Co. v. Fleet Bank of Maine, which held that 
“Congress has explicitly deemed a ‘notice’ regime insufficient to 
protect the government against false claims (indeed it was 
precisely such a regime that Congress sought to abandon in 
enacting the 1986 amendments) . . . .”328  
Furthermore, the court declared that Pfizer’s proposed 
government knowledge bar would conflict with another 
objective embodied in the 1986 amendments: “to help keep the 
government honest in its investigations and settlements with 
industry.”329 According to the court, once a relator’s allegations 
are made public, the government can be forced by public 
pressure to pursue false claims investigations that it might 
otherwise prefer to ignore.330 However, fewer qui tam actions 
would be brought, and thus less information would be made 
available to the public, if private qui tam actions were barred 
by a government knowledge rule such as that proposed by 
Pfizer. 
In addition, the court suggested that Pfizer’s proposed 
government knowledge rule would not be consistent with 
Congress’s goal of discouraging “parasitic” qui tam actions.331 
By prohibiting qui tam actions based on information that is 
kept confidential by government officials, Pfizer’s interpre-
tation would not only fail to discourage parasitic lawsuits, but 
would also discourage legitimate suits by relators based on 
“direct and independent knowledge” of wrongdoing.332 Finally, 
  
 325 Rost II, 507 F.3d at 730. 
 326 Id. (citing United States ex rel. Mathews v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 
853, 861 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 327 Id. 
 328 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting United States ex rel. S. Prawer & Co. v. 
Fleet Bank of Me., 24 F.3d 320, 329 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
 329 Id.  
 330 Id. 
 331 Id. 
 332 Id. 
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the court observed that several other circuits had rejected 
similar constructions of the government knowledge rule.333 
The second issue in Rost was whether the relator had 
pleaded his claim of fraud with sufficient particularity to 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b)—a familiar issue in FCA 
litigations.334 The trial court acknowledged that the relator’s 
complaint provided a great amount of detail about the 
defendants’ illegal marketing, promotion, and distribution of 
Genotropin as well as the bribes, kickbacks, and other financial 
incentives that the defendants had provided to distributors and 
physicians.335 However, the court also found that the complaint 
failed to identify any actual false claims that had been 
submitted to the government for reimbursement of off-label 
prescriptions of Genotropin.336 Instead, the relator had simply 
assumed that the defendants’ illegal marketing efforts must 
have caused at least some physicians to prescribe Genotropin 
for off-label uses and that at least some of these prescriptions 
must have been reimbursed by federal or state health care 
programs.337 Because the relator failed to plead the existence  
of false claims made to the government with sufficient 
particularity, the trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant 
to Rule 9(b).338 
On appeal, Dr. Rost argued that the trial court had 
interpreted Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements too strictly.339 
In response, Pfizer argued that the result below was mandated 
by the First Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. Karvelas 
v. Melrose-Wakefield Hospital.340 The Karvelas court had ruled 
that “a qui tam relator may not present general allegations in 
lieu of the details of actual false claims in the hope that such 
  
 333 Id. (citing Kennard v. Comstock Res., Inc., 363 F.3d 1039, 1043 (10th Cir. 
2004); United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1518 (9th 
Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939 (1997) (holding that the 1986 FCA 
amendment does not apply retrospectively to prior acts); United States ex rel. Williams 
v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1496 n.7 (11th Cir. 1991)). Only the Seventh Circuit, in 
United States ex rel. Mathews v. Bank of Farmington, has adopted the government 
knowledge approach. Id. at 731 (citing Mathews, 166 F.3d at 861). The Rost II court 
declared, “We simply disagree with Mathews for the reasons already stated and as 
lucidly set forth in the district court’s opinion.” Id. 
 334 Id. at 731-34. 
 335 Rost I, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 27. 
 336 Id. 
 337 Id. at 27-28. 
 338 Id. 
 339 Rost II, 507 F.3d at 731. 
 340 Id. (citing United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 
F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
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details will emerge through subsequent discovery.”341 The 
relator in that case alleged that his employer, a hospital, had 
submitted claims to government health care programs for 
services that were “provided improperly or not at all.”342 The 
court dismissed the relator’s complaint because it provided no 
specifics about particular false claims for payments that may 
have been made.343 Nevertheless, the Circuit Court in Rost 
found that Karvelas provided that the requirements of Rule 
9(b) may be satisfied even though some questions remained if 
the complaint as a whole is sufficiently particular to fulfill FCA 
pleading requirements.344 However, even giving the relator in 
Rost the benefit of this flexibility, the court still concluded that 
his claim failed to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 
9(b).345 
The court pointed out that, unlike in Karvelas, any false 
claims in Rost would have been submitted to the government 
by individual doctors and hospitals, not by the defendant, 
Pfizer.346 Thus, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the 
relator, Dr. Rost, to have had personal knowledge that false 
claims had been submitted by third parties. Given the fact that 
a substantial percentage of Genotropin prescriptions were 
written for off-label uses, it was highly probable that at least 
some of these prescriptions had been paid for by federal health 
care programs.347 However, the court observed that the relator’s 
position was somewhat undermined by a statement in the 
criminal information against Pfizer to the effect that most 
patients who take the drug for off-label purposes “paid out-of-
pocket without reimbursement from any public or private 
third-party payors.”348 After taking this offsetting evidence into 
account, the court concluded that the allegations contained in 
the relator’s complaint did not satisfy the particularity 
requirements of Rule 9(b): 
At most, Rost raises facts that suggest fraud was possible; but the 
complaint contained no factual or statistical evidence to strengthen 
the inference of fraud beyond possibility. It may well be that doctors 
  
 341 Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 231. 
 342 Id. at 223. 
 343 Id. at 233-35. 
 344 Rost II, 507 F.3d at 732 (citing Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 233 n.17). 
 345 Id.  
 346 Id.  
 347 Id. 
 348 Id. 
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who prescribed Genotropin for off-label uses as a result of 
Pharmacia’s illegal marketing of the drug withstood the temptation 
and did not seek federal reimbursement, and neither did their 
patients. It may be that physicians prescribed Genotropin for off-
label uses only where the patients paid for it themselves or when the 
patients’ private insurers paid for it. Rost did not plead enough to 
satisfy the concerns behind Rule 9(b).349 
Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the trial court’s Rule 
9(b) ruling.350 
Finally, the court considered whether Dr. Rost should be 
given an opportunity to amend his complaint in order to satisfy 
the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).351 The court 
observed that Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend a 
pleading “shall be freely given when justice so requires.”352 
Refraining from making an initial determination on the futility 
of amendment, the court remanded for further consideration on 
this issue.353 
 The Rost case serves as another illustration that the 
FCA can be a source of liability for manufacturers that promote 
off-label uses. However, relators that wish to bring such claims 
may have a tough time meeting the particularity requirement 
of Rule 9(b) for alleging fraud. 
5. United States ex rel. Richardson v. Bristol-Meyers 
Squibb 
One of the most recent False Claims Act cases involved 
the Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (“BMS”). In September, 
2007, BMS and its wholly-owned subsidiary Apothecon, Inc., 
reached a $515 million dollar settlement with the Department 
of Justice.354 The settlement resolved seven qui tam actions 
brought against BMS and Apothecon under the FCA.355 
According to the government, between the years 2000 and 2003 
BMS had paid doctors and other health care providers to 
  
 349 Id. at 733. 
 350 Id. 
 351 Id. at 733-34.  
 352 Id. at 733 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)). 
 353 Id. at 734. 
 354 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Bristol-Myers Squibb to Pay 
More Than $515 Million to Resolve Allegations of Illegal Drug Marketing and  
Pricing 1 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/ 
07_civ_782.html. 
 355 Id. at 2 
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purchase BMS pharmaceutical products.356 This illegal remu-
neration had included payments to physicians and others to 
enable them to participate in consulting programs, advisory 
boards, and preceptorships, often involving travel to luxury 
resorts.357 The government also claimed that BMS had 
knowingly promoted Abilify, an anti-psychotic drug, to treat 
pediatric patients and to treat dementia-related psychosis in 
geriatric patients—both of which were unapproved, off-label 
uses.358 The company’s sales representatives had allegedly 
urged child psychiatrists and pediatricians to prescribe Abilify 
to their patients.359 BMS had also assembled a specialized sales 
force that directed its attention almost entirely toward nursing 
homes that were likely to have large numbers of patients with 
dementia-related psychosis.360 
Pursuant to a settlement agreement, the federal govern-
ment recovered over $320 million, including a $25 million 
“disgorgement” of illegal profits arising from BMS’s illegal 
promotion of Abilify for off-label uses.361 In addition, BMS was 
required to pay $187 million to state Medicaid participants and 
$124,000 to certain other public health agencies.362 
Although the outcomes of the cases discussed above are 
mixed, it is clear that the False Claims Act represents a serious 
threat to drug companies that illegally promote off-label uses of 
their products. Both relators and the federal government are 
aggressively pursuing FCA cases against drug companies, and 
some of these companies have been forced to pay hundreds of 
millions of dollars in settlements. 
  
 356 Id. at 1. 
 357 Id. 
 358 Id. at 2. 
 359 Id. 
 360 Id. In addition, the government alleged that BMS and Apothecon had 
charged fraudulent and inflated prices for many of its oncology and generic drugs, 
knowing that the reimbursement rates provided by federal health care programs would 
be based on these higher prices. Id. Finally, the government charged that BMS had 
knowingly misreported its best price for the anti-depression drug Serzone by failing to 
include in its calculations lower-priced sales of the drug to a large commercial 
purchaser. Id. This action caused Medicaid and other public health providers, who 
were entitled to purchase drugs at the manufacturer’s “best price,” to pay more for 
these products than they would have if BMS’s best price information had been 
accurate. Id. 
 361 Id. 
 362 Id. Finally, BMS agreed to sign a corporate integrity agreement with the 
Department of Health and Human Services that requires it to report accurate average 
sales prices and average manufacturer prices for all of its products that are covered by 
Medicare or other federal health care programs. 
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IV.  TORT LIABILITY FOR PROMOTION OF OFF-LABEL USES 
Tort liability is the final pitfall for drug and medical 
device manufacturers that encourage physicians to make off-
label uses of their products. Of course, drug manufacturers are 
subject to liability for product-related injuries when their 
products are used for their intended purposes if they are 
defectively manufactured or designed or when the warnings 
provided are inadequate.363 However, additional theories of tort 
liability may be available to plaintiffs when they are injured by 
off-label uses of prescription drugs or medical devices. This 
portion of the Article examines four tort-based claims: 
(1) claims based on violations of the FDCA, including fraud-on-
the-FDA and negligence per se claims, (2) claims arising from 
fraudulent misrepresentation and improper marketing prac-
tices, (3) claims based on failure to warn, and (4) claims based 
on failure to test. 
A.  Tort Claims Based on Violations of the FDCA 
Plaintiffs are increasingly basing their claims against 
producers of drugs and medical devices on alleged violations of 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act or regulations promulgated 
by the FDA pursuant to the Act.364 At first, plaintiffs had often 
alleged that the defendants were guilty of “fraud-on-the- 
FDA.” However, more recently, they have tended to argue that 
violations of the FDCA constitute “negligence per se.” 
1. Fraud on the FDA 
There is general agreement that the FDCA does not 
authorize lawsuits by private individuals to enforce its pro-
visions.365 Nevertheless, during the 1990s, a number of lawsuits 
  
 363 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIAB. § 6 (1998). 
 364 James M. Beck & John A. Valentine, Challenging the Viability of FDCA-
Based Causes of Action in the Tort Context: The Orthopedic Bone Screw Experience, 55 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 389, 389 (2000). 
 365 See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bone Screw I), 
159 F.3d 817, 824 (3d Cir. 1998), rev’d, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 
U.S. 341 (2001); PDK Labs., Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1113 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 967-68 (6th Cir. 1995); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 
F.3d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1993); Pacific Trading Co. v. Wilson & Co., 547 F.2d 367, 370-
71 (7th Cir. 1976); Griffin v. O’Neal, Jones & Feldman, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 717, 718 (S.D. 
Ohio 1985); Nat’l Women’s Health Network, Inc. v. A.H. Robins Co., 545 F. Supp. 1177, 
1178 (D. Mass. 1980); Keil v. Eli Lilly & Co., 490 F. Supp. 479, 480 (E.D. Mich. 1980). 
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were brought against the manufacturers of various spinal 
fixation implant devices366 alleging that these manufacturers 
had lied to the FDA in order to obtain permission to market 
their products.367 Specifically, these plaintiffs contended that 
the manufacturers of fixation implant devices had assured the 
FDA that their devices would be marketed for bone surgeries 
and other approved uses when in fact the manufacturers had 
intended to market them for an off-label use as pedicle spinal 
implant devices.368 The plaintiffs claimed that by making these 
false assurances to the FDA, the manufacturers had been  
able to obtain approval for these devices under the premarket 
notification process369 instead of the more lengthy and 
  
 366 In spinal fusion surgery, bone graft material, usually taken from the 
patient’s hipbone, is inserted between two vertebrae to create a single immobile block 
to reduce the pain caused when vertebrae move in different directions. Valente v. 
Sofamor, S.N.C., 48 F. Supp. 2d 862, 864 (E.D. Wis. 1999). The rods are be attached to 
vertebrae by spine-hooks, wires, or metal screws (known as bone screws) that are 
inserted into the pedicles of neighboring vertebrae and connected to rods or plates to 
reduce movement between these vertebrae. Cali v. Danek Med., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 
941, 945 (W.D. Wis. 1998). If the spinal fusion surgery is successful, the bone graft and 
the vertebrae fuse together to form a single bony mass. Minisan v. Danek Med., Inc., 79 
F. Supp. 2d 970, 972 (N.D. Ind. 1999). Once this occurs, the spinal fixation device can 
be removed. Menges v. Depuy Motech, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 817, 822 (N.D. Ind. 1999). 
Pedicles are two rearward facing bony arches on either side of the vertebrae that 
support the lamina. Minisan, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 972 n.1.  
  Various types of bone screw fixation devices have been the subject of 
litigation. These include AcroMed’s Variable Screw Placement (“VSP”) Device (Bone 
Screw I, 159 F.3d at 821; Reeves v. AcroMed Corp., 44 F.3d 300, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1995); 
Dutton v. AcroMed Corp., 691 N.E.2d 738, 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)); Artifex’s HBH 
Spinal System (Sharp v. Artifex, Ltd., 110 F. Supp. 2d 388, 389 (W.D. Pa. 1999)); 
Danek’s Texas Scottish Rite Hospital (“TSRH”) Spinal System Device (Minisan, 79 F. 
Supp. at 972; Sita v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 249-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); 
King v. Danek Med., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429, 431 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)); Danek’s Dyna-
Lok Device (Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 155-56 (4th Cir. 1999)); Danek’s 
Luque System (Cali, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 946); Smith & Nephew Richards’s Rogozinski 
System (Blinn v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1356 (M.D. Fla. 
1999)); and Sofamor’s Cotrel Dubousset System (Smith v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 21 F. Supp. 
2d 918, 919 (W.D. Wis. 1998)).  
 367 Bone Screw I, 159 F.3d at 820; Reeves, 44 F.3d at 303-04; Dutton, 691 
N.E.2d at 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); see also Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 
232-33 (6th Cir. 2000) (cardiac pacemaker).  
 368 Bone Screw I, 159 F.3d at 820; Reeves, 44 F.3d at 306; Dutton, 691 N.E.2d 
at 740. 
 369 The Medical Device Amendments provide that medical devices that are 
“substantially equivalent” to an existing approved device can secure marketing 
authorization from the FDA through a premarket notification, or § 510(k), process. 21 
U.S.C. 360(k)-(o) (2006); U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Premarket Notification 510(K), 
http://www.fda.gov/CDRH/DEVADVICE/314.html. For a discussion of the premarket 
notification process, see Richard C. Ausness, “After You, My Dear Alphonse!”: Should 
the Courts Defer to the FDA’s New Interpretation of § 360k(a) of the Medical Device 
Amendments?, 80 TUL. L. REV. 727, 733 (2006); see also Trent Kirk, Comment, Fraud-
on-the-FDA & Buckman—The Evolving Law of Federal Preemption in Products 
Liability Litigation, 53 S.C. L. REV. 673, 681 (2002). 
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expensive premarket approval procedure (“PMA”).370 Under the 
fraud-on-the-FDA theory, the devices in question would never 
have been marketed in the absence of this fraud and therefore 
the manufacturers should be liable for any resulting injuries, 
even though the plaintiffs could not prove that the devices were 
defective.371  
Until 2001, there was a split of authority over whether 
fraud-on-the-FDA claims were preempted by the Medical 
Device Amendments to the FDCA.372 The U.S. Supreme Court 
resolved this conflict in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal 
Committee.373 The plaintiffs in Buckman contended that they 
had been injured by surgical bone screws manufactured by 
AcroMed Corporation.374 They alleged that the manufacturer 
and its consultant, the Buckman Company, had obtained FDA 
approval to market the screws as “substantially equivalent” 
devices by claiming that they would be used in the long bones 
of the arms and legs when the company actually had intended 
to market them principally for use in spinal fusion surgery.375  
The Buckman Court held that the plaintiffs’ fraud-on-
the-agency claims were impliedly preempted by the Medical 
Device Amendments.376 According to the Court, a conflict exists 
between common-law tort claims like the plaintiffs’ and the 
FDA’s need to balance a number of competing regulatory 
objectives.377 One such objective is to protect the integrity of the 
licensing process. Section 510(k)’s disclosure requirements help 
achieve this objective, as do the wide range of enforcement 
options available to the FDA to detect and punish fraudulent 
  
 370 For a discussion of the PMA procedure, see Sasha B. Rieders, Note, State 
Law Tort Claims and the FDA: Proposing a Consumer-Oriented Prescription in Medical 
Device Cases, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1159, 1167-71 (2004). 
 371  It is not known whether any of these plaintiffs ultimately prevailed. 
However, one court stated, “No federal court has resolved this question in favor of the 
plaintiff’s claim.” Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 967 (6th cir. 1995). 
 372 Kemp, 231 F.3d 233-36 (holding that fraud-on-the-FDA claims are 
expressly preempted by the MDA); Bone Screw I, 159 F.3d at 823-25 (refusing to hold 
that such claims were preempted); Reeves, 44 F.3d at 302 (holding that such claims 
were preempted). For a discussion the FDA’s marketing approval process under the 
MDA, see supra text accompanying notes 33-44. 
 373 531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
 374 Id. at 343. 
 375 Id. at 346. 
 376 Id. at 348. 
 377 Id.  
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applications.378 However, the FDA also must ensure that its 
licensing process does not slow down the introduction of new 
medical products into the market or interfere with the 
judgment of health care professionals.379 In particular, the 
Court observed that allowing fraud-on-the-FDA claims would 
discourage off-label uses because drug companies would be 
concerned with potential tort liability.380 Finally, the Court 
emphasized that the claims involved were not ordinary tort 
claims, but instead were based entirely on noncompliance  
with FDA disclosure requirements.381 The Buckman decision 
effectively shut down fraud-on-the-FDA claims. Enterprising 
plaintiffs’ lawyers quickly shifted from this theory to a thinly 
disguised substitute known as negligence per se. 
2. Violations of the FDCA as Negligence Per Se 
Under the principle of negligence per se, a court relies 
upon a statute or administrative regulation to define the 
standard of care in a negligence action.382 By successfully 
invoking negligence per se, the plaintiff establishes as a matter 
of law that the defendant’s conduct was negligent so that the 
plaintiff need only prove causation and damages in order to 
prevail.383 Plaintiffs have argued that manufacturers of phar-
maceutical products and medical devices who violate the FDCA 
or FDA regulations are negligent and subject to civil liability 
under state negligence per se doctrines for any injuries that  
are proximately caused by such violations. In general, most 
courts have declined to embrace this application of negligence 
  
 378 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 348-49. Even the less rigorous premarket notifica-
tion requirements under § 510(k) require applicants to provide the FDA with 
information about the device’s design and function. Id. at 345-46. 
 379 Id. at 349-50. 
 380 Id. at 350. 
 381 Id. at 352-53. 
 382 Andrew E. Costa, Negligence Per Se Theories in Pharmaceutical & Medical 
Device Litigation, 57 ME. L. REV. 51, 54 (2005). 
 383 In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bone Screw II), 193 F.3d 
781, 790 (3d Cir. 1999); In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 1118 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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per se.384 Other courts have rejected negligence per se claims 
because the plaintiff was unable to prove causation.385 
Talley v. Danek Medical, Inc. reflects the reasoning of 
those courts that have refused to apply the doctrine of 
negligence per se to claims based on alleged violations of the 
FDCA.386 In that case, medical device manufacturer Danek had 
secured FDA approval for the Dyna-Lok Device, a pedicle screw 
fixation device,387 as a Class II device, which would not require 
premarket approval from the FDA,388 although at that time 
such devices had been classified as Class III devices, which 
would require premarket approval through the PMA process 
before being marketed for pedicle screw fixation.389 The 
plaintiff, Janet Talley, had undergone a number of unsuc-
cessful back surgeries in which the Dyna-Lok Device was 
attached to the pedicles of her spine. Danek had not sought 
premarket approval for the Dyna-Lok Device at the time of 
Talley’s operations.390 After suffering injuries and complications 
from the surgeries, Talley sued Danek, maintaining that the 
company had deliberately marketed the Dyna-Lok Device for a 
use that had not been approved by the FDA in violation of the 
FDCA and that the company had therefore been negligent as a 
matter of law.391 Unlike the fraud-on-the-FDA cases, in which 
the plaintiffs focused their allegations on an unauthorized 
presence of off-label uses in the market, Talley argued that it 
was the promotion of the Dyna-Lok Device for off-label uses, 
rather than its mere presence in the market, that had caused 
her injuries.392 The lower court granted the defendant’s motion 
  
 384 Bone Screw II, 193 F.3d at 792; Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 
161 (4th Cir. 1999); Sharp v. Artifex, Ltd., 110 F. Supp. 2d 388, 394-95 (W.D. Pa. 1999); 
Baker v. Danek Medical, 35 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (N.D. Fla. 1998); King v. Danek Med., 
Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429, 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Cali v. Danek Med., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 
941, 954 (W.D. Wis. 1998). But see Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 
558-59 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 385 Menges v. Depuy Motech, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 817, 829 (N.D. Ind. 1999); 
Minisan v. Danek Med., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 970, 975-77 (N.D. Ind. 1999); Sita v. 
Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 264-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Valente v. Sofamor, 
S.N.C., 48 F. Supp. 2d 862, 876-77 (E.D. Wis. 1999); Baker v. Danek Medical, Inc., 35 
F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (N.D. Fla. 1998); Osburn v. Danek Med., Inc., 520 S.E.2d 88, 94 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Harden v. Danek Med., Inc., 985 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1998). 
 386 Talley, 179 F.3d at 160-61. 
 387  See supra note 366. 
 388 Talley, 179 F.3d at 160. 
 389 Id.  
 390 Id. 
 391 Id. at 160. 
 392 Id. 
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for summary judgment, concluding that Talley had failed to 
show any evidence of negligence, and the plaintiff appealed.393  
On appeal, the plaintiff in Talley renewed her claim 
that Danek had violated the FDCA by marketing a surgical 
device for a use that had not been approved by the FDA.394 In 
particular, the plaintiff argued that “while purportedly selling 
the Dyna-Lok Device for its Class II purpose, Danek was in fact 
marketing the device for the unapproved Class III purpose of 
use in the pedicles of the spine . . . .”395 According to the 
plaintiff, this alleged violation of the FDCA supported a claim 
based on negligence per se.396 However, the court observed that 
the doctrine of negligence per se does not automatically create 
a private cause of action for every violation of a statute.397 In 
the first place, not all statutory provisions establish a standard 
of care, and therefore not all statutory violations provide a 
basis for applying the doctrine of negligence per se.398 In 
addition, even when a statute does establish a standard of care, 
the plaintiff must also prove the additional elements of 
negligence, including duty, causation, and injury.399 
Addressing the standard of care issue, the court 
declared that violation of a statute that does not define a stan-
dard of care but merely imposes an administrative requirement 
will not support a negligence per se claim.400 According to the 
court, licensing and reporting requirements, even when they 
are part of a regulatory scheme that is designed to protect 
public safety, are statutory requirements that do not establish 
a standard of care.401 Applying this principle to the FDA’s 
licensing requirements, the court concluded that the general 
requirement that drugs and medical devices receive FDA 
approval before marketing was “only a tool to facilitate 
administration of the underlying regulatory scheme” and did 
not embody any substantive standard of care.402 Consequently, 
even if Danek had failed to comply with the FDA’s licensing 
  
 393 Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 725 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
 394 Talley, 179 F.3d at 160. 
 395 Id.  
 396 Id. 
 397 Id. at 158. 
 398 Id. at 159. 
 399 Id. 
 400 Id. 
 401 Id. 
 402 Id. at 161. 
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requirements, this by itself would not support a negligence per 
se claim.403  
Moreover, as previously noted, the court held that even 
if the doctrine of negligence per se were applicable, the plaintiff 
would still be required to prove the other elements of a 
negligence claim.404 In this case, the court determined that the 
plaintiff failed to present any evidence that Danek’s failure to 
obtain proper FDA approval for the Dyna-Lok Device had 
caused her injuries.405 Indeed, as the court pointed out, the 
FDA’s subsequent approval of pedicle screw fixation devices as 
Class II devices suitable for spinal fusion surgery indicated 
that the agency thought that bone screw devices such as the 
defendant’s product could be safely used for this purpose.406 Nor 
was there any evidence that the plaintiff’s doctor would have 
chosen some other device if he had known that the FDA had 
not approved the Dyna-Lok Device for spinal fusion surgery at 
the time of the plaintiff’s operation.407 Consequently, the court 
concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that the 
defendant’s alleged violation of the statute had proximately 
caused her injuries and therefore upheld the lower court’s 
dismissal of her negligence per se claim.408  
A Tennessee appeals court in King v. Danek Medical, 
Inc. agreed with the Talley court’s reasoning.409 Like Talley,  
 King involved a negligence per se claim against the manu-
facturer of the TSRH device, a pedicle screw spinal fixation 
mechanism similar to Danek’s Dyna-Lok device.410 Danek had 
obtained an Investigational Device Exemption to conduct 
clinical trials on its TSRH Device.411 However, according to the 
plaintiffs, while these clinical trials were going on, Danek had 
promoted the device for use in spinal pedicle surgery “[o]n a 
massive and perhaps unprecedented basis,” thereby violating 
various provisions of the FDCA.412 On appeal from the trial 
court’s dismissal of their claim, the plaintiffs argued that 
marketing a surgical device that had not received premarket 
  
 403 Id. 
 404 Id. at 158. 
 405 Id. at 161. 
 406 Id. 
 407 Id. 
 408 Id. 
 409 King v. Danek Med., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 410 Id. at 430. 
 411 Id. at 455. See supra note 39 for an explanation of the IDE process. 
 412 Id. 
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approval from the FDA violated the FDCA and constituted 
negligence per se.413 Quoting Talley, the appellate court 
declared that the requirement of FDA approval prior to 
marketing is “only a tool to facilitate administration of the 
underlying regulatory scheme.”414 Furthermore, because the 
approval requirement lacks any “independent substantive 
content,” it does not embody a standard of care.415 The court 
concluded that breach of this requirement is akin to driving 
without a driver’s license and provides no basis for a negligence 
per se claim.416 Consequently, the King court affirmed the lower 
court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim.417  
In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liability Litiga-
tion presents an interesting variation on the negligence per  
se argument because the case involved conspiracy claims.418 
This multidistrict litigation involved more than 2000 lawsuits 
and approximately 5000 individual plaintiffs.419 The plaintiffs 
alleged that several conspiracies existed on the part of bone 
screw manufacturers and others to promote their orthopedic 
bone screw products in violation of FDA regulations.420  
The plaintiffs first claimed that individual bone screw 
manufacturers had agreed to give royalties and stock options to 
orthopedic surgeons and other physicians in return for their 
participation in seminars that were held apparently to inform 
physicians about the medical uses of bone screw devices.421 
According to the plaintiffs, the real purpose of these seminars 
was to promote the bone screw manufacturer’s products.422 In 
addition, the physicians who conducted these seminars had 
failed to inform their audiences that the bone screw devices 
they were promoting had not received FDA approval for use in 
pedicle fixation surgery and that clinical trials had actually 
  
 413 King, 37 S.W.3d at 455. 
 414 Id. at 457. 
 415 Id. 
 416 Id. 
 417 Id. at 460. 
 418 Bone Screw II, 193 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Cali v. Danek Med., 
Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 941, 947 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (alleging a conspiracy among bone screw 
manufacturers to promote an off-label use of their products). For a discussion of the use 
of civil conspiracy theories in products liability litigation, see Richard C. Ausness, 
Conspiracy Theories: Is There a Place for Civil Conspiracy in Products Liability 
Litigation?, 74 TENN. L. REV. 383 (2007). 
 419 Bone Screw II, 193 F.3d at 784. 
 420 Id. at 786-87. 
 421 Id. at 786. 
 422 Id. 
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raised serious concerns about the safety and effectiveness of 
bone screw devices when used in this manner.423 Furthermore, 
seminar speakers had not disclosed that they had a financial 
interest in promoting this form of off-label use.424 
The plaintiffs’ second civil conspiracy claim alleged that 
bone screw device manufacturers had paid various professional 
associations to sponsor and present seminars for orthopedic 
surgeons in order to promote the use of bone screws in spinal 
fixation surgery.425 As in the previous conspiracy claim, the 
plaintiffs declared that the conspirators had concealed that the 
FDA had not approved the use of bone screws in pedicle 
fixation surgery, that studies had revealed problems with this 
procedure, and that the professional associations had been paid 
to promote the off-label use of these devices.426 The plaintiffs 
also claimed that a trade association established by the 
conspirators had conducted a fraudulent study to use in civil 
litigation and that certain conspirators, in order to obtain 
§ 510(k) clearance for their products as substantially equiva-
lent devices, had falsely told the FDA that one company had 
marketed a bone screw device for pedicle fixation surgery prior 
to 1976.427 
The lower court dismissed these claims, holding that an 
independent basis of liability was necessary to bring a civil 
conspiracy claim and that violation of the FDCA did not satisfy 
this requirement.428 On appeal, the Third Circuit observed that 
there is no private right of action for violations of the FDCA.429 
The court also agreed with the lower court’s conclusion that one 
cannot sue a group of defendants for conspiring to engage in 
conduct that would not be actionable against an individual 
defendant.430 Because the plaintiffs could not sue individual 
defendants for violations of the FDCA, they could not sue them 
for conspiring to engage in conduct that violates the FDCA 
either.431  
The plaintiffs also argued that violations of federal 
statutes could be the basis of common law liability under the 
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principle of negligence per se and thereby provide the under-
lying tort necessary to support a civil conspiracy claim.432 The 
appeals court, however, responded that negligence per se did 
not create an independent basis of tort liability, but merely 
established a standard of care for an underlying tort.433 In the 
court’s view, the plaintiffs’ bootstrapping interpretation of 
negligence per se “would allow private plaintiffs to recover for 
violations of a federal statute that creates no private cause of 
action and, in fact, expressly restricts its enforcement to the 
federal government.”434 If the plaintiffs were allowed to prevail, 
they could sidestep the FDCA’s prohibition against private 
enforcement actions merely by bringing a civil conspiracy 
action instead of suing defendants for individual actions.435 For 
this reason, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ conspiracy 
claims were properly dismissed.436 
As mentioned earlier, a number of courts have also 
rejected negligence per se claims on causation grounds.437 
Menges v. Depuy Motech, Inc. is illustrative of this approach.438 
This case also involved the marketing of orthopedic bone screw 
devices for use in spinal fusion therapy.439 The plaintiff alleged 
that, because the pedicle screw device did not have FDA 
approval for implantation into the vertebral pedicle, Depuy 
Motech was prohibited from marketing it for use in spinal 
fixation surgery and had a duty to regulate the use of its 
devices in hospitals.440 According to the plaintiff, the defen-
dant’s violation of FDA regulations constituted negligence per 
se.441 In response to a motion for summary judgment by the 
defendant, the court acknowledged that Wisconsin law would 
permit the plaintiff to base his negligence per se claim on 
violation of the FDCA.442 However, the court ultimately granted 
the defendant’s summary judgment motion, finding that the 
plaintiff had not produced any medical evidence that his 
  
 432 Bone Screw II, 193 F.3d at 790. 
 433 Id.  
 434 Id. at 791. 
 435 Id. 
 436 Id. at 792. 
 437  See supra note 385 and accompanying text. 
 438 Menges v. Depuy Motech, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 817 (N.D. Ind. 1999). 
 439 Id. at 820. 
 440 Id. at 823. 
 441 Id. at 829. 
 442 Id. (citing Valente v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 48 F. Supp. 2d 862, 876 (E.D. Wis. 
1999)). 
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doctor’s use of the defendant’s device was a proximate cause of 
his injury.443  
B. Fraudulent Misrepresentation  
In addition to basing tort claims on violations of the 
FDCA, injured consumers have also sued drug and medical 
device manufacturers for fraudulent misrepresentation.444 A 
fraudulent misrepresentation claim requires proof by clear and 
convincing evidence of the following elements:  
(1) a representation; (2) which is material to the transaction at hand; 
(3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to 
whether it is true or false; (4) with the intent of misleading another 
into relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; 
and (6) the resulting injury was proximately caused by the 
reliance.445  
Fraudulent misrepresentation claims in this area have often 
failed because plaintiffs were unable to establish either 
reliance or causation.446  
Miller v. Pfizer Inc. (Roerig Division) is illustrative of 
the difficulties plaintiffs face when they base their claim on 
fraudulent misrepresentation.447 The plaintiffs in Miller sued 
Pfizer in federal court after its anti-depression drug, Zoloft, 
allegedly caused their thirteen-year-old son, Matthew, to 
commit suicide.448 The plaintiffs sought to hold Pfizer strictly 
liable for marketing defects and misrepresentations about 
Zoloft.449 Pfizer moved for partial summary judgment on the 
defective marketing and failure-to-warn claims.450 
  
 443 Id. 
 444 See, e.g., McCauley v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 331 F. Supp. 2d 449, 461 (W.D. 
Va. 2004) (OxyContin); Wethington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 218 F.R.D. 577, 582 (S.D. 
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Ct. App. 1998) (spinal fixation device). 
 445 Ausness, supra note 418, at 400 (quoting Goldstein v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
854 A.2d 585, 590-91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)). 
 446 Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 161 (4th Cir. 1999); McCauley, 
331 F. Supp. 2d at 462; Sita v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 260 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999); Baker v. Danek Med., 35 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (N.D. Fla. 1998); Osburn, 520 
S.E.2d at 95; Harden, 985 S.W.2d at 453. 
 447 Miller v. Pfizer Inc. (Roerig Div.), 196 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (D. Kan. 2002). 
 448 Id. at 1097. 
 449 Id. In addition, the complaint set forth a negligence claim based on the 
defendant’s failure to test and warn about the risk of drug-induced suicide when Zoloft 
was prescribed off-label for children. Id. 
 450 Id. 
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With respect to their “defective marketing claim,” the 
plaintiffs contended that Pfizer had “gone to great lengths to 
reassure doctors that the violence and suicide problems that 
they ha[d] heard about, mainly with its chief SSRI competitor 
Prozac, would not occur with Zoloft, and to assuage patient’s 
[sic] concerns over the initial adverse effects which are 
frequently the harbingers of tragedy . . . .”451 As evidence of this 
marketing scheme, the plaintiffs relied on statements made  
by a Pfizer employee, James Lee Jung.452 Mr. Jung had told  
the defendant’s professional medical representatives not to 
mention the risk of suicide from Zoloft to physicians unless 
they specifically asked about it.453 In addition, Jung had told 
the representatives that if they were asked about suicide risk, 
they should assure physicians that Zoloft had a low risk of 
suicide ideation.454  
Since the plaintiffs did not set forth any specific legal 
basis for their marketing defect claim, the court chose to 
characterize it as a fraud or misrepresentation claim.455 The 
court pointed out that to sustain such a claim, plaintiffs must 
prove, inter alia, that they “reasonably relied and acted on  
the [defendant’s] allegedly false representations to their 
detriment.”456 There apparently was no evidence that the 
plaintiffs had relied on any representations made by Pfizer; 
instead, the court concluded, “In allowing Matthew to use 
Zoloft, plaintiffs relied solely on Dr. Geenens’s [Matthew’s 
physician] advice.”457 
According to Pfizer, even if the plaintiffs could show 
reliance on their part, the learned intermediary doctrine 
required them to prove that Dr. Geenens had relied on 
marketing materials or other information about Zoloft that 
Pfizer had provided him.458 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, Dr. 
Geenens steadfastly maintained that his decision to prescribe 
Zoloft to treat Matthew’s depression had not been influenced by 
  
 451 Id. at 1119 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 452 Id. at 1100 n.7. 
 453 Id. 
 454 Id. 
 455 Id. at 1119. 
 456 Id. 
 457 Id. at 1099. 
 458 Id. at 1120. The learned intermediary doctrine provides that a manufac-
turer satisfies its duty to warn about a prescription drug’s inherent risks without 
warning the patient directly when it adequately warns the prescribing physician. See 
infra text accompanying notes 513-517.  
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Pfizer’s advertising or promotional materials.459 Furthermore, 
Dr. Geenens testified that Pfizer’s sales representatives had 
never encouraged him to prescribe Zoloft for any off-label 
uses.460 In response, the plaintiffs argued that the Kansas 
Supreme Court, in Hurlbut v. Conoco, Inc.,461 had eliminated 
the reliance requirement in misrepresentation cases involving 
products.462 However the court rejected their interpretation  
of Hurlbut.463 The plaintiffs also urged the court to adopt  
the position stated in Section 9 of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability,464 which would impose liability on 
product manufacturers for even innocent misrepresentations  
of material facts.465 The court noted that even under Section 9 
of the Restatement, proof of causation is required and if the 
plaintiffs could not establish reliance, they could not establish 
causation either.466 The plaintiffs also asked the court to reject 
the learned intermediary doctrine, thereby relieving them of 
the burden of proving reliance on Dr. Geenens’s part.467 
However, the court concluded that there was no evidence to 
show that Kansas courts had rejected the learned intermediary 
doctrine or were about to do so.468  
The plaintiffs’ final argument was that Pfizer’s mar-
keting campaign for Zoloft relied on subtle and subliminal 
techniques to persuade physicians like Dr. Geenens to 
prescribe Zoloft. The plaintiffs maintained that Dr. Geenens 
could have been influenced by these subliminal messages to 
prescribe Zoloft to Matthew.469 According to this argument, the 
reliance requirement for misrepresentation would be satisfied 
even though Dr. Geenens denied that he had relied on any 
representations about the safety of Zoloft provided by Pfizer. 
However, the court ultimately concluded that even if Pfizer  
had employed subliminal advertising techniques, the plaintiffs 
failed to show that they had any effect on Dr. Geenens’s 
  
 459 Miller, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 1100. 
 460 Id. 
 461 856 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Kan. 1993). 
 462 Miller, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 1120. 
 463  Id. 
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decision to prescribe Zoloft to their son.470 Consequently, the 
court granted the defendant’s request for summary judgment 
on the marketing defect and misrepresentation claims.471  
 Thus, as Miller illustrates, although misrepresentation 
claims are available in theory to plaintiffs seeking recovery 
from pharmaceutical companies that promote off-label uses, in 
reality this cause of action does not pose a serious threat to 
drug manufacturers because of the difficulties in making out a 
case.  
C.  Failure to Warn 
Product sellers, including manufacturers of drugs and 
medical devices, have a duty to warn about the inherent risks 
associated with the use of their products when the risks may 
not be obvious to consumers. Some cases are concerned with 
whether a manufacturer must warn about risks that are 
unique to particular off-label uses of the product. Another 
group of cases have considered what role the learned 
intermediary rule plays when a product is used for an off-label 
purpose. 
1.  Failure to Warn About Risks Associated with 
Particular Off-Label Uses 
A manufacturer has a duty to provide an adequate 
warning of any danger inherent in the normal use of its 
product that is not likely to be within the knowledge of the 
ordinary user.472 In some cases, this duty may require a drug 
manufacturer to warn physicians about the risks of particular 
off-label uses. For example, in Knowlton v. Deseret Medical, 
Inc., the manufacturer of a catheter and needle placement unit 
known as Intracath was held liable for chemical burns suffered 
by the plaintiff during open-heart surgery.473 The plaintiff’s 
surgery involved a procedure known as retrograde threading, 
in which two small hollow flexible tubes, or catheters, are 
inserted into the left and right atria of the heart.474 The 
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catheter in Knowlton was used to transmit the drug Nitro-
prusside (Nipride) to the patient’s heart.475 Some of the Nipride 
solution leaked from a cut or hole in the catheter into the 
plaintiff’s chest and abdominal walls, causing severe chemical 
burns.476 
At trial, the jury found that the manufacturer had failed 
to adequately warn physicians of the danger inherent in the 
use of the Intracath device.477 On appeal, the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals observed that the Intracath device was 
intended for use in venipunctures—the insertion of the needle 
and catheter into a vein.478 However, there was testimony that 
the manufacturer had been aware that the use of its catheters 
and needles as atrial lines during open-heart surgery was a 
common off-label procedure.479 Furthermore, company officials 
had acknowledged that they knew there was a significant risk 
that the catheter tube might be cut or nicked by the needle if 
retrograde threading were employed.480 The appeals court also 
noted that a cut or nick sufficient to create a hole in the 
catheter would be invisible to the naked eye and, thus, unlikely 
to be discovered by the operating surgeon.481 Finally, the court 
found that a warning was appropriate because a reasonably 
prudent heart surgeon would not be aware of the danger 
inherent in the retrograde threading procedure.482 Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the jury verdict was correct 
and upheld the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim against the 
defendant.483 
An Illinois appellate court reached a similar result in 
Proctor v. Davis.484 Proctor concerned the Upjohn Company’s 
1959 FDA approval to market the anti-inflammatory drug 
Depo-Medrol for intramuscular (in the muscle), intra-articular 
(in the joint), and intralesional (in a lesion) injections.485 Depo-
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 484 682 N.E.2d 1203, 1215 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997). 
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Medrol was a sterile, aqueous suspension containing methyl 
prednisone acetate, a corticosteroid, and was useful in treating 
various inflammatory bodily disorders.486 Depo-Medrol was an 
insoluble toxic material that was intended to be released in the 
patient’s body over a period of six to eight weeks and ultimately 
carried away in the bloodstream.487  
Shortly after the FDA approved the drug, two ophthal-
mologists independently contacted Upjohn about using Depo-
Medrol clinically to treat ophthalmic conditions by means of 
periocular (near the eye) injections. Upjohn encouraged the 
doctors and provided them with a supply of the drug for  
their proposed use, but failed to inform them that no animal 
studies had been performed to test the drug’s effect on 
periocular tissue.488 Subsequently, in the early 1960s, Upjohn 
also provided financial support to doctors who used Depo-
Medrol for unapproved subconjunctival injections.489 Further-
more, the drug company also distributed an article about  
off-label uses of the drug, but failed to provide information 
about “unsatisfactory” animal experiments that the author had 
conducted.490 As periocular injection of Depo-Medrol became 
increasingly popular,491 partly due to Upjohn’s marketing 
efforts, the company considered submitting a supplemental 
New Drug Application for this use to the FDA, but decided not 
to do so.492 In fact, periocular injection of Depo-Medrol was 
quite risky because if the physician inadvertently injected the 
drug into the patient’s eye, it would remain in the eye for a 
long time and cause serious injury because the eye does not 
possess a blood supply to enable it to remove the drug.493 
Moreover, because Depo-Medrol was insoluble, it increased 
pressure within the eye and caused other damage.494  
In 1983, the plaintiff’s physician, Dr. Davis, began a 
program of periocular injections of Depo-Medrol to treat vision 
problems associated with cystoid macular edema.495 During one 
of these treatments, Dr. Davis mistakenly injected Depo-
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Medrol directly into the plaintiff’s left eye.496 Despite a series of 
subsequent operations to remove the drug and repair the 
damage to his left eye, the plaintiff eventually lost all vision in 
the eye and his physicians were forced to remove it.497 The 
plaintiff filed suit in 1984 against Dr. Davis and Upjohn, 
alleging malpractice against the doctor and claiming that 
Upjohn had failed to warn doctors about the dangers of using 
Depo-Medrol for off-label periocular injection.498 The jury found 
in favor of Dr. Davis, but subjected Upjohn to liability for 
compensatory and punitive damages.499  
On appeal, the Illinois appellate court declared that a 
drug manufacturer has a continuing duty to warn of product-
related risks that are not generally known to the medical 
community.500 According to the court, when the manufacturer of 
a potentially harmful product possesses information not 
generally known to prescribing physicians, it has a duty to 
share this information with them by means of warnings.501 In 
this case, the record showed that at the time of the operation 
Upjohn was aware of the risks associated with periocular 
injection of Depo-Medrol and was also aware that many 
ophthalmologists were administering the drug in this fashion 
as an off-label use.502 Consequently, Upjohn had a legal 
obligation to warn about the risks of periocular injection of 
Depo-Medrol, and its failure to do so made the drug defective 
and unreasonably dangerous.503  
Knowlton and Proctor suggest that most courts will 
probably uphold failure-to-warn claims if the risks associated 
with a particular off-label use is serious, the use is common or 
widespread, and if the manufacturer knows of the off-label use 
or has encouraged it.504 On the other hand, drug companies 
ordinarily have no duty to warn of off-label uses that are 
unforeseeable. In Rhoto v. Ribando, a self-proclaimed weight 
reduction specialist prescribed a regime of prescription 
medications, along with a conservative diet plan, to help the 
  
 496 Id. at 1210. 
 497 Id. at 1211. 
 498 Id. 
 499 Id. 
 500 Id.  
 501 Id. at 1213-14. 
 502 Id. at 1212. 
 503 Id. at 1213. 
 504 Noah, supra note 7, at 161-62. 
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plaintiff lose weight.505 After following this weight-loss program 
for two weeks, the plaintiff suffered a massive stroke.506 In her 
suit against the drug manufacturers, the plaintiff argued that 
they had failed to warn of the danger of a stroke when various 
drugs were used individually or in combination with other 
drugs prescribed in connection with her weight reduction 
program.507 At the conclusion of the trial, the court directed a 
verdict for the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff’s 
doctor grossly misused the drugs.508  
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the warnings for 
the individual drugs were inadequate because they did not 
warn about the dangers associated with using them in weight 
control programs, a practice that the manufacturers knew or 
should have known was taking place.509 The court, however, 
observed that all of the expert witnesses at trial testified that 
the prescription of the particular combination of drugs used in 
the plaintiff’s diet plan was a gross misuse of the products.510 
The court declared that a manufacturer is only required to 
warn of dangers associated with the normal use of its product 
and concluded that the warnings provided by the drug 
manufacturers in this case satisfied this requirement.511 
Consequently, it affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of 
the defendants.512 
2.  The Learned Intermediary Doctrine as a Defense to 
Failure-to-Warn Claims 
The learned intermediary rule is a substantial barrier to 
recovery for plaintiffs who bring failure-to-warn claims. As 
noted above, as a general rule, manufacturers have a duty to 
warn the ultimate users or consumers of their products about 
the inherent risks of those products when the risks may not be 
obvious. However, an exception to the general rule, known at 
the “learned intermediary doctrine,” applies to prescription 
  
 505 Rhoto v. Ribando, 504 So. 2d 1119, 1120 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
 506 Id.  
 507 Id. at 1121. 
 508 Id. 
 509 Id. at 1123-24. 
 510 Id. at 1124. 
 511 Id. at 1124-26. 
 512 Id. at 1126. 
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drugs and medical devices.513 The learned intermediary rule 
provides that the manufacturer of a prescription drug or 
medical device is only required to warn a patient’s prescribing 
physician and does not have to warn the patient directly.514 
This rule gets its name from the fact that the physician is 
expected to act as an informed intermediary between the 
manufacturer and the patient.515 Thus, the manufacturer may 
be held liable for injuries caused by the defective prescription 
of a product if the manufacturer fails to provide an effective 
warning to the prescribing physician.516 On the other hand, if a 
manufacturer provides an adequate warning to the prescribing 
physician, the manufacturer is not subject to liability, and the 
physician has a duty to pass this information on to the 
patient.517 However, a plaintiff cannot prevail on a failure-to-
warn theory against a manufacturer even when the defendant’s 
warning is inadequate if the learned intermediary (the 
physician) was already aware of the risk at the time of 
prescription. In effect, the defendant’s failure to warn is not 
regarded as a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injury. Drug 
manufacturers have often successfully invoked this principle in 
off-label use cases. 
Sita v. Danek Medical, Inc. illustrates this principle. In 
that case, a plaintiff who underwent spinal fixation surgery 
sustained injuries when the defendant’s bone screw device, the 
TSRH System, fractured.518 In a suit against the manufacturer, 
the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the warnings in the 
product’s package insert had not been adequate.519 The plaintiff 
contended that although the package insert had warned about 
such risks as pseudarthrosis, breakage, neurological impair-
ment, and pain, it should have also disclosed that the TSRH 
  
 513 See Yonni D. Fushman, Comment, Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc: Toward 
Creating a Direct-to-Consumer Advertisement Exception to the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2000). 
 514 Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to 
Greater Tort Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
97, 106-07 (2002). 
 515 Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (E.D. Mich. 1991); 
Martin v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (N.Y. 1993). 
 516 See Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1228 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979). 
 517 See Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984). This is 
an aspect of a physician’s obligation to inform patients of the risks associated with a 
particular treatment under the doctrine of informed consent. See generally Peter H. 
Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 (1994)  
 518 Sita v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 250 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 519 Id. at 259. 
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Device had not been approved for pedicle implantation.520 
According to the plaintiff,  
due to the boiler-plate nature of the language used and the 
warning’s failure to state that certain components of the TSRH 
System had not been approved for use in pedicle surgery, these 
warnings, taken alone, might not fully apprise a doctor of the risks 
associated with the use of TSRH components.521  
However, the court rejected this argument, pointing out 
that the package insert had expressly stated that the TSRH 
System’s components were intended for “attachment to the 
sacrum or illium only.”522 In the court’s opinion, this language 
was sufficient to inform an experienced doctor, such as the 
plaintiff’s physician, that the TSRH screws had not been 
approved for use in the pedicles.523 Accordingly, the court 
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the 
failure-to-warn claim.524 
3.  Overpromotion as a Defense to Adequate Warnings 
An otherwise satisfactory warning may be deemed to be 
inadequate in a failure-to-warn case because the manufacturer 
diluted the effect of the warning by “overpromotion.”525 For 
example, assurances of safety by a drug company’s sales 
representatives may negate FDA-approved warnings contained 
in product labeling or the Physician’s Desk Reference.526 
Courts appear to be split on the question of whether  
a plaintiff can maintain an overpromotion claim when the 
physician is aware of the risk that has been diluted by the 
manufacturer’s overpromotion. Love v. Wolf527 and Formella v. 
Ciba-Geigy Corp.528 represent differing views on this issue. Love 
involved Cholormycetin, a wide-spectrum antibiotic manufac-
tured by Parke-Davis529 that was widely prescribed for off-label 
  
 520 Id. 
 521 Id. 
 522 Id. at 259-60. 
 523 Id. at 260. 
 524 Id. 
 525 David G. Owen et al., in 2 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 22:8, at 565-66 (3d ed. 2000). 
 526 See, e.g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 284 (Pa. 1971), abrogated on 
other grounds by Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 421 A.2d 1027 (Pa. Sept. 1980). 
 527 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Ct. App. 1964). 
 528 300 N.W.2d 356 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). 
 529 Love, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 184. 
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uses during the 1970s.530 The plaintiff suffered severe aplastic 
anemia after her doctor prescribed Cholormycetin to treat a 
gum infection.531 At the time of the plaintiff’s injury, Cholor-
mycetin’s package labeling warned of the risk of aplastic 
anemia and other blood dyscrasias and cautioned that the drug 
“should not be used indiscriminately or for minor infections.”532 
The labeling also declared that adequate blood studies should 
be made when Cholormycetin was prescribed for intermittent 
or prolonged use.533 
The plaintiff’s physician, Dr. Wolf, prescribed a total of 
ninety-six Cholormycetin capsules during a relatively short 
time to treat a gum infection and bronchitis, but failed to 
perform any blood tests.534 At the trial, Dr. Wolf admitted that 
these conditions were not sufficiently dangerous to fall within 
the types of infections that Cholormycetin was intended  
to treat.535 The jury apparently believed that the plaintiff’s 
injuries were caused by Dr. Wolf’s off-label prescription of  
the drug and found in favor of the plaintiff.536  
On appeal, the court acknowledged that Parke-Davis 
had warned about the risk of aplastic anemia and had urged 
physicians to perform blood tests when Cholormycetin was 
prescribed on a long-term basis.537 The court then turned to the 
plaintiff’s argument that “such warnings must be deemed can-
celled out if overpromotion through a vigorous sales program 
persuaded doctors to disregard the warnings given.”538 The 
court described how the Parke-Davis sales representatives  
had encouraged off-label use of the drug by downplaying the 
risk of aplastic anemia and falsely informing physicians that  
the FDA had approved Cholormycetin “with no restrictions  
on the number or range of diseases for which Cholormycetin  
may be administered.”539 The court also observed that sales of 
Cholormycetin were so numerous that it was apparent that  
  
 530 Christopher, supra note 13, at 249. 
 531 Love, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 184. According to the court, aplastic anemia is a form 
of blood dyscrasia, a “condition resulting from the depression or destruction of the 
blood-forming elements in the bone marrow.” Id. at 185. 
 532 Id.  
 533 Id. 
 534 Id. at 186. 
 535 Id. at 196. 
 536 Id. at 184. 
 537 Id. at 193. 
 538 Id. 
 539 Id. at 195. 
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the product was being prescribed for non-approved uses.540 
Although the court reversed the verdict because of misconduct 
on the part of the plaintiff’s lawyer, it refused to dismiss the 
case against the drug company and instead ordered a new trial 
on the overpromotion issue.541  
However, at least one legal commentator has criticized 
the court’s reasoning in Love.542 As Jonathan Grant pointed out, 
notwithstanding the defendant’s promotional efforts, Dr. Wolf 
was fully aware of the risks of long-term use of Cholormycetin, 
yet chose to prescribe it anyway.543 In Dr. Wolf’s case, Parke-
Davis’s overpromotion did not vitiate the warnings that it 
provided on the drug’s labeling and, therefore, did not cause 
the plaintiff’s injuries.544 In other words, Dr. Wolf’s negli-
gence—if his prescription of Cholormycetin was negligent—was 
the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury, not overpromotion of  
the drug by Parke-Davis.545  
A Michigan appellate court reached a different conclu-
sion from that in Love in Formella v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.546 The 
plaintiff in that case developed aplastic anemia as a result of 
taking Tandearil, a drug manufactured by the defendant.547 The 
plaintiff brought suit, claiming that the drug company Ciba-
Geigy overpromoted Tandearil and failed to adequately warn 
her doctor about the risk of developing blood dyscrasia.548 At the 
end of the trial, the lower court granted the Ciba-Geigy’s 
motion for a directed verdict.549 On appeal, the plaintiff con-
tended that the trial court should not have excluded evidence of 
Ciba-Geigy’s marketing plans.550 The appeals court observed 
that the drug’s package insert had indicated that the drug  
was contraindicated for patients, like the plaintiff, who were 
allergic to penicillin.551 The package insert also had cautioned 
against treating persons over age sixty with Tandearil for more 
  
 540 Id. 
 541 Id. at 197. 
 542 Jonathan E. Grant, The “Misuse” Defense in Drug Products Liability Cases, 
8 PACE L. REV. 535, 553 (1988). 
 543 Id.  
 544 Id. 
 545 Id. 
 546 300 N.W.2d 356 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). 
 547 Id. at 357. 
 548 Id. 
 549 Id. 
 550 Id. 
 551 Id. at 359. 
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than a week.552 In this case, the plaintiff was over sixty and her 
doctor had treated her with the drug for lower back pain (an 
off-label use) for more than six weeks.553 Finally, the package 
insert had also recommended that blood tests be performed 
weekly for elderly patients taking Tandearil. The plaintiff’s 
doctor had not performed any blood tests until she developed 
symptoms of aplastic anemia.554 
The court concluded that the plaintiff’s doctor had been 
aware that taking Tandearil for any length of time could cause 
blood dyscrasia and had ignored this risk.555 According to the 
court, even if the drug company was guilty of overpromoting 
Tandearil, thereby diluting the effectiveness of the warnings, 
overpromotion was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 
injury.556 Rather, the decision of the plaintiff’s doctor to adopt a 
treatment regime that he knew would greatly increase the risk 
of blood dyscrasia had been an independent cause—and the 
sole proximate cause—of her injury.557 Accordingly, the court 
affirmed the lower court’s judgment in favor of Ciba-Geigy.558 
The court’s approach in Formella seems to represent the 
prevailing view on the overpromotion issue in failure-to-warn 
cases.559 
In general, failure to warn is a potential source of 
liability for drug manufacturers. In particular, manufacturers 
who promote off-label uses may be held liable for failing to 
warn doctors about the risks associated with a known off-label 
use. Moreover, even when manufacturers do provide warnings, 
a court may treat the warnings as inadequate if the manufac-
turer dilutes their effectiveness by overpromotion.  
D.  The Duty to Test for Off-Label Related Risks 
Manufacturers are unlikely to test off-label uses of their 
products unless the FDA orders them to do so or they intend to 
file a supplemental NDA because clinical trials and other forms 
of testing can be expensive. Moreover, the failure to test for 
risks associated with particular off-label uses ordinarily does 
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 553 Id. at 357. 
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 555 Id. at 358. 
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 559 Grant, supra note 542, at 554. 
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not constitute negligence or make the product defective or 
unreasonably dangerous. However, at least one court has 
imposed liability for failure to test.560  
In that decision—Medics Pharmaceutical Corp. v. 
Newman—the plaintiff was stricken with clear cell adeno-
carcinoma as a result of her mother’s ingestion of DES.561 The 
plaintiff’s mother during her pregnancy had taken Diastyl, a 
brand of DES marketed, but not manufactured, by the 
defendant in order to prevent miscarriage.562 The defendant 
claimed that it had not promoted Diastyl for use in preventing 
miscarriages and that the drug’s package labeling had not 
mentioned this as an indicated use.563 However, physicians had 
been commonly prescribing DES for this purpose at the time 
the plaintiff’s mother became pregnant.564 The plaintiff brought 
suit, alleging that the defendant had failed to make a 
reasonable effort to discover whether there were any risks 
associated with using its product to prevent miscarriages.565 
When the jury found in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant 
appealed.566 
On appeal, the defendant argued that it could not be 
held liable for the plaintiff’s injuries because it had not 
recommended or marketed Diastyl for the prevention of 
miscarriages.567 In response, however, the court declared that 
“[t]he maker of an article for sale or use by others must use 
reasonable care and skill in designing it . . . so that it is 
reasonably safe for the purposes for which it intended, and for 
other uses which are foreseeably probable . . . .”568 The court 
distinguished between the duty to warn and the duty to test: 
The defendant was not negligent in failing to inform the 
  
 560 See Medics Pharm. Corp. v. Newman, 378 S.E.2d 487 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
 561 Id. at 488. DES is a synthetic estrogen that was originally developed to 
alleviate menstrual symptoms but was later widely marketed for treating women who 
were at risk for miscarriage. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, About DES, 
http://www.cdc.gov/des/consumers/about/effects_daughters.html. Unfortunately, many 
female children of the women who had taken DES while pregnant developed clear cell 
adenocarcinoma, a form of cancer, when they reached puberty. Id.; see also Ausness, 
supra note 418, at 386-87. 
 562 Newman, 378 S.E.2d at 488. 
 563 Id. 
 564 Id. 
 565 Id. at 488-89. 
 566 Id. at 488. 
 567 Id. 
 568 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 319 
S.E.2d 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)). 
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medical profession of the risk of cancer associated with Diastyl 
because the risk had not been known at the time the plaintiff’s 
mother ingested the drug.569 However, drug manufacturers are 
required to use “reasonable care to provide a product which is 
reasonably safe for those purposes for which it could 
foreseeably be used.”570 In this case, the defendant’s duty of 
reasonable care required it to try to discover whether there 
were any dangers to the unborn fetus in using Diastyl for the 
prevention of miscarriages.571 
Although the general principle espoused in Newman 
may be correct, the court’s application of the principle to the 
particular facts of that case is problematic for three reasons. 
First, the defendant was a distributor, not a drug manufac-
turer. Therefore, it would be highly unreasonable to expect the 
company to conduct clinical research on a generic drug like 
DES. Second, unlike most of the cases discussed in this Article, 
the defendant in Newman did not promote off-label uses of 
Diastyl. Apparently, the court was willing to impose a duty to 
test for risks associated with off-label uses simply because the 
defendant profited from the distribution of its product to 
physicians who intended to prescribe it for off-label uses. 
Finally, even if the defendant had engaged in drug testing, it is 
doubtful that it could have discovered a correlation between 
ingestion of the drug by pregnant women and subsequent 
cancer in their unborn daughters. According to the court, the 
plaintiff’s mother took Diastyl in 1963 or 1964, but the cancer 
risk was not discovered by researchers until the early 1970s.572 
There is no reason to think that the defendant would have 
discovered this risk ten years sooner if it had engaged in 
testing.  
Plaintiffs have developed an impressive array of tort 
liability theories in actions against pharmaceutical companies 
that encourage off-label uses of their products. Although fraud-
on-the-FDA, negligence per se and fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion theories have not been very successful, some failure-to-
warn claims have succeeded. In addition, at least one court has 
held a drug company liable for failing to test for off-label 
related risks. 
  
 569 Id. at 489. 
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V.  REGULATING THE PROMOTION OF OFF-LABEL USES 
A.  Sources of Danger 
Bad things can happen to drug companies that promote 
and market their products for off-label uses. There are a 
number of sources of danger, as outlined above. The first source 
is the FDCA itself. The promotion of off-label uses in violation 
of the FDCA can constitute misbranding and lead to civil and 
criminal liability.573 As the manufacturer of OxyContin 
discovered, the fines and civil penalties can amount to millions 
of dollars.574  
RICO and FCA violations pose a second potential source 
of risk to pharmaceutical companies that promote and market 
their products for off-label uses.575 Cases brought under these 
statutes usually involve fraudulent schemes to evade restric-
tions on compensation of off-label uses by Medicaid or other 
government-sponsored health care programs. Although the 
drug companies managed to avoid liability in Hamm and 
Neurontin, the two RICO cases discussed earlier, RICO 
remains a potential source of liability.576 For example, a group 
of health insurance plans have brought a class action suit 
against Pfizer, claiming that it engaged in a fraudulent scheme 
to market Lipitor for off-label uses, which caused them to  
pay billions of dollars for Lipitor prescriptions that violated 
federal guidelines for treating cholesterol.577 In addition to 
charging Pfizer with fraud and violation of state consumer 
protection laws, the plaintiffs asserted claims under RICO.578 
Finally, drug companies have been sued in qui tam actions 
brought under the FCA.579 The defendants prevailed in two of 
these reported cases—United States ex rel. Hess v. Sanofi-
Synthelabo, Inc.580 and United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer 
  
 573 Greene, supra note 5, at 46. 
 574 See supra Part II.C. 
 575  See supra Part III. 
 576 See supra Part III.A (discussing Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., 
Inc., 187 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 1999); In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D. Mass. 2006)). 
 577 For a discussion of this case, see On Pharma, Off Label Marketing  
for Lipitor’s Now the Focus of a Class-Action Suit (Mar. 30, 3006), http:// 
pharmamanufacturing.wordpress.com/2006/03/30/off-label-marketing-for-lipitors-now-
the-focus-of-a-class-action-suit/. 
 578 Id. 
 579  See supra text accompanying notes 198-362. 
 580 No. 4:05CV570, 2006 WL 1064127 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 21, 2006). 
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Inc.581—but the manufacturer of Neurontin paid $430 million to 
settle a FCA case,582 and a number of other FCA cases also 
resulted in large settlements.583  
Tort law is the third source of danger to drug manu-
facturers.584 Although the Supreme Court concluded that fraud-
on-the-FDA claims are impliedly preempted by the FDCA,585 
numerous plaintiffs have tried to avoid the preemption bar by 
invoking the doctrine of negligence per se instead.586 So far, 
however, claims based on statutory violations have not been 
well received by the courts.587 Fraudulent misrepresentation 
claims have not fared well either because plaintiffs have had 
difficulty proving reliance and causation.588 Failure-to-warn 
claims have met with mixed results.589 Defendants have 
prevailed in most of the reported cases,590 but plaintiffs have 
won a few.591 Finally, at least one court has imposed liability on 
a distributor of a prescription drug for failing to test for 
possible side effects from a commonly prescribed off-label use of 
the drug.592 
  
 581 446 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D. Mass. 2006), vacated and remanded, 507 F.3d 720 
(1st Cir. 2007). 
 582 See United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, Div. of Warner-Lambert 
Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001); Cinquegrana & Lloyd, supra note 259. 
 583 The website for the organization Taxpayers Against Fraud maintains a list 
of recent FCA settlements involving drug companies. Taxpayers Against Fraud, Top 20 
False Claims Act Cases, http://www.taf.org/top20.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2008). 
 584  See supra Part IV. 
 585 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001).  
 586 Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1999); Menges v. 
Depuy Motech, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 817, 829 (N.D. Ind. 1999); King v. Danek Med., Inc., 
37 S.W.3d 429, 430-31 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); see supra Part IV.A.2. 
 587 See Talley, 179 F.3d at 157; Menges, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 829; King, 37 S.W.2d 
at 430-31; supra Part IV.A. 
 588 See Talley, 179 F.3d at 164; McCauley v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 331 F. 
Supp. 2d 449, 462 (W.D. Va. 2004); Sita v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 260 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999); Baker v. Danek Med., 35 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (N.D. Fla. 1998); 
Osburn v. Danek Med., Inc., 520 S.E.2d 88, 95 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Harden v. Danek 
Med., Inc., 985 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); supra Part IV.B. 
 589  See supra Part IV.C. 
 590 Sita, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 245, 265; Rhoto v. Ribando, 504 So. 2d 1119, 1120 
(La. Ct. App. 1987); Formella v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 300 N.W.2d 356, 359 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1980). 
 591 See, e.g., Knowlton v. Deseret Med., Inc., 930 F.2d 116, 124 (1st Cir. 1991); 
Love v. Wolf, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 199 (Ct. App. 1964); Proctor v. Davis, 682 N.E.2d 1203, 
1217 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997). 
 592 Medics Pharm. Corp. v. Newman, 378 S.E.2d 487, 488 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); 
see supra Part IV.D.  
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B.  Changing the Current Regulatory Policy    
The current regulatory approach to off-label use of 
drugs and medical devices is inconsistent and incoherent. On 
one hand, the FDA tolerates and even approves of the 
widespread prescription of drugs and medical devices for off-
label uses. At the same time, the FDA discourages pharma-
ceutical companies from disseminating information about off-
label uses to health care professionals.593 In addition, federal 
health care programs often do not reimburse health care 
providers for off-label therapies. This creates a serious 
dilemma for drug companies. They have a strong financial 
incentive to encourage off-label uses of their products by 
directing promotional efforts at physicians and other health 
care professionals. At the same time, drug companies that wish 
to promote off-label uses of their products are often forced to 
engage in conduct that exposes them to substantial civil and 
criminal liability.594 
The rationale for discouraging off-label uses is that 
some of these uses may be dangerous or ineffective. Fen-phen 
is perhaps the most famous example of an off-label prescription 
drug use that posed significant safety risks.595 The drug 
fenfluramine was originally approved by the FDA for short-
term use by obese patients. However, common off-label uses 
included use in connection with another drug, phentermine; 
use of the drug beyond the approved period; and use of the drug 
by persons who were overweight but not obese.596 Unfor-
tunately, long-term use of the fen-phen combination caused 
heart valve damage to many patients.597 Other examples of 
drugs that have caused injuries or were determined to be 
ineffective after they were prescribed for off-label uses include 
Letrozole, approved for the treatment of breast cancer but 
prescribed as a fertility drug, and Actimmune, a drug approved 
to treat two rare diseases but prescribed to treat idiopathic 
pulmonary fibrosis.598 Letrozole caused birth defects, and 
  
 593 Greene, supra note 5, at 48. 
 594 Id. at 67-68. 
 595 Fen-phen is a combination of fenfluramine, a serotinergic agent, and 
phentermine, an amphetamine-like substance. Wilsker, supra note 25, at 825-26. Both 
of these drugs suppress appetite, though in different ways. Id. 
 596 Salbu, supra note 6, at 203.  
 597 Greene, supra note 5, at 47. 
 598 Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-
Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 969 (2007). 
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Actimmune was eventually found to be ineffective for treating 
pulmonary fibrosis. 
The FDA’s ambivalent attitude regarding the promotion 
of off-label uses by drug companies reflects the fact that the 
agency is faced with two competing regulatory goals, and there 
is no obvious way to reconcile or balance them. The competing 
goals are the speedy introduction of new and innovative 
treatments for disease and the need to assure the public that 
prescription drugs and medical devices are effective and 
reasonably safe. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to 
formulate a fully developed regulatory policy regarding off-
label use, it might be useful to examine a few alternatives to 
the present policy.  
We start with the assumption that a complete ban on 
the promotion of off-label uses would have an adverse effect on 
public health because it would inhibit the dissemination of 
information about innovative medical treatments.599 As long as 
the FDA allows physicians to prescribe drugs and medical 
devices for unapproved uses, it makes no sense for the agency 
to limit access to information about such uses. Therefore, the 
FDA should revise its current policy to permit drug companies 
to promote off-label uses of their products in the same manner 
as they promote approved uses. In order to reduce the risks of 
off-label use, the FDA should monitor promotional material for 
accuracy and should require researchers who publish their 
findings in scientific journals or speak at medical educational 
programs to disclose any financial interest they may have in 
the product.600 At the same time, the FDA should be able to 
require a drug company to warn doctors when it becomes 
aware of a risk associated with an off-label use,601 and if the 
risk is significant, the agency should have the power to require 
the manufacturer to prepare a supplemental NDA if it wishes 
to continue promoting a particular off-label use. To be sure, if 
drug manufacturers are allowed to freely promote off-label uses 
of their products, they will have less incentive to undertake  
the time-consuming and expensive process of seeking FDA 
approval. However, as we have seen, as long as Medicare and 
  
 599 Merrill, supra note 21, at 1855. 
 600  Polubinski, supra note 30, at 1033-34.  
 601 The FDA currently maintains a website called Drug Watch which provides 
doctors with information about off-label prescriptions. Johns, supra note 598, at 1006; 
see also Stoffelmayr, supra note 31, at 276 (arguing for a tort-based duty on the part of 
drug manufacturers to warn of all demonstrated risks of off-label uses of their 
products). 
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Medicaid programs do not reimburse health care providers  
for off-label uses, drug manufacturers will still have some 
incentive to seek FDA approval for uses that are currently off-
label.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Off-label uses of prescription drugs and medical devices 
are common and widely accepted within the medical 
profession.602 Unfortunately, the FDA restricts the ability of 
drug manufacturers to promote off-label uses of their products. 
In addition, government health insurance programs often do 
not reimburse health care providers for off-label uses of 
pharmaceutical products. Drug companies who act improperly 
risk liability for violating the FDCA, RICO, or the FCA. Drug 
manufacturers may also be subject to tort liability based on 
theories of negligence per se, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
failure to warn, and failure to test for risks associated with off-
label uses. All of this not only subjects drug companies to 
substantial financial risks, but also discourages them from 
providing physicians with useful information about new and 
effective treatments.  
  
 602 Merrill, supra note 21, at 1854. 
